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Articles

SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC DECISIONS
Mark A. Chinen*
I. INTRODUCTION

Secrecy to protect intelligence sources and methods arises often in
the nation's discourse on several controversial security matters.
Protective secrecy itself is controversial because it seems inimical to
democracies, where open discussion and accountability serve as
touchstones.' Citizens, to whom their government is supposed to be
accountable, appear to be in a quandary. It seems with national security
matters and the secrecy that often cloaks them, people "cannot evaluate
some policies and processes because the act of evaluating defeats the
policy or undermines the process" in question.2
Patrick Keefe suggests we digest concepts like national security
"whole, to take them as undifferentiated and unexamined absolutes." 3
The same holds true with secrecy to protect intelligence sources and
methods. My purpose here is to unpack the sources and methods
argument. There have been a number of explorations of this reason for
secrecy, as well as secrecy and democracy more generally, 4 but what I
*

Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I would like to express my

thanks to Charity Anastacio and Jeffrey Leeper for their research assistance for this project,
and as always, to Robert Menanteaux, research librarian at the Seattle University School of
Law.
1. Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181 (1999).
2. Id. at 182.
3.
PATRICK R. KEEFE, CHATrER: UNCOVERING THE ECHELON SURVEILLANCE
NETWORK AND THE SECRET WORLD OF GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING xvi (2006).

4.

Among many authors who have examined secrecy and democracy are SISSELA BOK,

SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION (1982); PAT M. HOLT,
SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY (1995); LOCH K.
JOHNSON, AMERICA'S SECRET POWER: THE CIA IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1989); William
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hope to contribute to the debate is my belief that the argument for
protective secrecy needs to be assessed on at least two levels. In a
democracy, it is appropriate to ask about the extent to which democratic
Values or processes guide the uses of secrecy. I argue in Part II that such
principles and processes frame and legitimate questions about secrecy,
but in and of themselves they do not always provide definitive guidance
about the uses of secrecy to protect sources and methods. It appears a
democratic government can accommodate uneasy compromises between
openness and secrecy.
The second level of inquiry is more technical and for the most part
specific to sources and methods. In Part III, I point out that the
protection of sources and methods can be a compelling reason for
secrecy, but not always. 5 Given general knowledge about certain
intelligence sources and methods, and, to a lesser extent, differences in
their vulnerability to countermeasures, the need for secrecy is not
uniform. Further, the protection of sources and methods is only as
important as the intelligence derived from them, which in turn is only as
important as the role intelligence plays in policymaking. The value and
influence of either can be modest. Additionally, the secrecy argument is
akin to the precautionary principle, which in some contexts provides
little help in decision-making.
Finally, as is usually true when
information asymmetries exist, secrecy creates inefficiencies and
perverse incentives in the collection, processing, and dissemination of
intelligence, which in the end allows the government to shift the costs of
inaccurate information to citizens and yet remain unaccountable for
those costs.
In Part IV, I juxtapose the conclusions drawn from these two levels
of inquiry and ask what can be learned from the fact that at best
democratic principles and processes offer rough guidance on how to use
secrecy, but that the secrecy argument itself is often unconvincing. As an
initial matter, it means the relationship between democracy and
protective secrecy is not one of abstract ideals against the concrete

E. Colby, Intelligence Secrecy and Security in a Free Society, 1 INT'L SECURITY 3 (1976);
Michael V. Hayden, Balancing Security and Liberty: The Challenge of Sharing Foreign
Signals Intelligence, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 247 (2005); Thompson,
supra note 1; see also COMM'N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY,

SECRECY,
S.
DOC.
NO.
105-2
(1997),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/index.html.
5. As I note in Part III, there are other reasons for protecting classified information

from disclosure, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
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realities of national security. It also means it is proper to ask tough
questions of proponents of secrecy-particularly when decisions of
national moment are being considered, like going to war, or when
individual civil liberties are at stake and one is determining whether the
government is obeying laws designed to protect those liberties-and to
heavily discount the secrecy argument when such questions are not
satisfactorily answered. Lastly, it provides ways to assess how well
elected representatives and others charged with oversight respond to
those who hold and wield secrets.
II. DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES AND SECRECY
A. Democracy and the Dangersof Secrecy
Amartya Sen argues that the most important development of the
past 100 years has been the emergence of democracy "as the
preeminently acceptable form of governance., 6 Similarly, in his
remarks on the rule of law, J.H.H. Weiler states it is now generally
accepted that obedience to law can "neither be claimed, nor justified, if
the laws in question did not emanate from a legal system embedded in
some form of democracy." 7 Given this strong legitimating power, it is
natural to ask whether democracy, either as an idea or in its incarnations,
can help society make difficult choices, including how to use secrecy.
Indeed, democracy and secrecy seem to be linked: the question of
legitimacy boils down to whether citizens have a moral obligation to
obey or to respect the laws and decisions of their government. 8 Secrecy
is useful to a society, 9 but it also seems to threaten that very
6.

Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1999, at 3, 4.
7. J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law-Governance, Democracy and
Legitimacy, 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 547 (2004). But see Joshua Cohen, Is there a Human
Right to Democracy?, in THE EGALITARIAN CONSCIENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF G. A.
226, 226 (Christine Sypnowich ed., 2006) (arguing that non-democratic governments
can claim legitimacy as long as they are responsive to the interests of their citizenry).
COHEN

8. See Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist
Framework of Analysis 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 908 (2004) (pointing out that "[t]he very idea

of legitimacy develops clearer contours when connected to questions of obedience.").
9. Sissela Bok identifies three reasons why secrecy is useful to a society: deliberation,
surprise, and confidentiality. BOK, supra note 4, at 175-76. By deliberation, Bok refers to the
ability of government agencies (or any group) to consider a course of action before it is made
public, out of a concern that pre-mature transparency will stifle the deliberative process. Id. at
175. Further, secrecy is sometimes needed to preserve the element of surprise in government
actions. Id. at 176. Offshoots of these justifications include the need for secrecy in
diplomatic relations, the development or abandonment of plans, and missions in wartime, see,
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legitimacy. ° Does it matter therefore how secrecy is used in a
democracy? Is it meaningful to speak of democratic and undemocratic
uses of secrecy, such that we know when to allow secrecy and when to
forbid it?
Of course, these are hard questions. Democracy itself is an underspecified term" such that there is the danger of setting up a straw man.
Since one must begin somewhere, however, consider John Dunn's
argument that "the structure of modem representative democracy ...
provides . . . a practical basis through which to refuse to be ruled

unaccountably and indefinitely against your will.' 12 He adds, "Less
steadily and on far less egalitarian terms, it also provides a framework
through which to explore
what people should and should not attempt to
'3
do as a community."'
Much is packed into these two sentences. For Dunn, citizens must
have some say in who governs, no matter how attenuated this ability
might be, due to the delegation of power in large, modem democracies.
Concomitant with say in governance are accountability and limitations
on power. There is also Dunn's sense that democracy provides a space
for communal decisions, although for Dunn not everyone has an equal
voice in that space. Given this spare and highly qualified description of
the term, it is not surprising Dunn doubts democracy's ability to help
decide "what people should and should not attempt to do as a
community." In his view, "Virtually none of the elements of an answer
to that question can come from democracy as an idea."'14 This is not a
propitious starting point, but it is worth asking in what sense Dunn could
be right.
The idea of having a say in who governs is accompanied by a web
of interrelated concepts: equality, autonomy, meaningful consent,
freedom from coercion, accountability, the protection of civil liberties,
e.g., COMM'N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, supra note 4, at 6-7,

and the need to protect the privacy of innocent citizens. BOK, supra note 4, at 176; see also
AMY GUTMANN &

DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 4

(2004)

(discussing justifications for secrecy in government).
10. Allen Dulles writes: "Free peoples everywhere abhor government secrecy. There is
something sinister and dangerous, they feel, when governments 'shroud' their activities. It
may be an entering wedge for the establishment of an autocratic form of rule, a cover-up for
their mistakes." ALLEN DULLES, THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE 237 (1963).

11. Weiler, supra note 7, at 547.
12. John Dunn, Getting democracy into focus, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Oct. 20, 2005,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-opening/focus-2944.jsp (emphasis in original).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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as well as institutional features deemed necessary to enable selfgovernment, such as free and fair elections, universal suffrage, etc. Two
such ideas I focus on here stem from a general sense that persons are not
bound to collective decisions unless they have in some meaningful way
consented to be so bound. 15 This in turn leads to concepts familiar in
any system of agreement: agreements must be free from coercion or the
inappropriate withholding of relevant information, or there is no real
assent.
Both concepts appear in a number of accounts of democracy. Take,
for example, coercion. For Dunn, democracy as an idea "requires the
systematic elimination of power (the capacity to make others act against
their own firm inclinations) from human relations.,"16
Frank
Michelman's "jurisgenerational" politics entail "a set of prescriptive
social and procedural conditions such that one's undergoing, under those
conditions, such a dialogic modulation of one's understandings is not
considered or experienced as coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a
violation of one's identity or freedom." 17
Of course, these and other scholars accept that some level of
coercion is inevitable because, as Robert Dahl argues, the complete
absence of coercion leads to anarchy. ' 8 Coupling the idea of democracy
with representative government enables persons to enjoy, on the one
hand, the economies of scale possible in large populations and territories
(including those that go to security) and on the other, institutions that
approximate democratic forms of government. 19
In modem
democracies, persons have delegated decision-making power to their
elected leaders. But the agency problems that arise with representatives,
and the tenuous link between most citizens and their elected leadersbecause of the size of the nation-state-make it equally sensible to argue
that the average citizen has very limited ability to participate in, and

15. Either at a specific point in history, such as the ratification of a constitution, or as a
necessary part of a theory of democracy.
16. JOHN DUNN, DEMOCRACY: A HISTORY 169 (2005). Dunn thinks it is impossible to
order a society based on this idea.
17. Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, 1526-27 (1988).
18.

ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 37-51 (1989).

19. Id. at 28-30, 213-16. It is this delegation of authority that leads to institutions such
as elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office,
freedom of expression, access to alternative information, and associational autonomy. Id. at
221.
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thereby
meaningfully consent to, important decisions that impact her
20
life.
It is precisely where the degree of delegation is high that the
connection between coercion and access to relevant information
becomes most salient. As Amy Gutmann and Denis Thompson put it,
consensus requires people to give accessible reasons for decisions
because "[t]o justify imposing their will on you, your fellow citizens
must give reasons that are comprehensible to you."'2' Although some
coercion may be inevitable in large democracies, the point where
delegation of authority limns into authoritarianism is where there cease
to be comprehensible reasons for exercises of authority. Such reasons
include descriptions of states of the world that require exercises of
governmental power to respond to them. Secrecy can, of course, be used
to conceal overt forms of government coercion, but more subtle and
widespread coercion can arise when meaningful discussion of public
decisions requires an accurate assessment of a given situation, and
secrecy is used to distort that assessment.
It is not surprising then that Gutmann and Thompson begin their
most recent account of deliberative democracy by discussing the lead-up
to the Second Iraq War. This presents the hard case. "The decision to
go to war, it would seem, is unfriendly territory for pursuing the kind of
reasoned argument that characterizes political deliberation., 22 Gutmann
and Thompson note that when the Bush Administration announced it
would take military action against Saddam Hussein, it understood the
need to justify its actions to the American people and to the world, and
so in the months before the invasion, the Administration found itself in a
heated debate with Congress, and later, the United Nations. The
government argued that war was justified because it believed, based in
part on classified information, that Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the
United States and to international peace and security: first, because his

20. With important exceptions discussed in Part IV, this might particularly be the case
with foreign affairs and national security. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Can international
organizations be democratic? A skeptic's view, in DEMOCRACY'S EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro &
Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999) (discussing a general lack of public involvement in
foreign affairs issues).
21. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 4. John Dryzek, who also writes from a
deliberative perspective, argues for democratic authenticity, measured by the degree to which
social control takes place through communication that encourages reflection on one's
preferences without coercion. JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND:
LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS 8 (2000).
22. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 1.
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regime was developing weapons of mass destruction, and second,
because it was associated with terrorists who had attacked the United
States. There was vigorous debate about those claims, and about the
methods for responding to the purported threat, but such debate was "cut
short" by the invasion in 2003.23 Subsequent events have proved neither
of the two claims was true.24
Accurate assessments of information go to both what one might
term democracy's substantive aspects, such as freedom from coercion,
and its procedural aspects; here it is difficult to separate idea from
institution. Again, what makes the process of opinion formation and the
selection of policies both at the grass-roots level and in the legislature so
crucial, particularly in highly plural societies, is its link to legitimacy:
government decisions must be based on plausible reasons, and the
process of deciding is circumvented when the reasons any branch of
government gives for its actions cannot be verified or are not based in
fact. Jtirgen Habermas notes: "Democratic procedure, which establishes
a network of pragmatic considerations, compromises, and discourses of
self-understanding and of justice, grounds the presumption that
reasonable or fair results are obtained insofar as the flow of25 relevant
information and its proper handling have not been obstructed.
What happens, then, when information flows are obstructed or
mishandled? Gutmann and Thompson argue, "When a primary reason
offered by the government for going to war turns out to be false, or
worse still, deceptive, then not only is the government's justification for
war called into question, so also is its respect for citizens. 2 6 At the
extreme, using secrecy to withhold information that undercut reasons for
choosing a particular policy also undermines the legitimate expectations
of persons governed, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of those
who govern them.27

23.
24.

Id. at 2.
See infra text accompanying notes 169-73.

25.

JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 296 (William Rehg trans.

1996). Elsewhere Habermas writes: "Deliberative politics acquires its legitimating force from
the discursive structure of opinion-and will-formation that can fulfill its socially integrative
function only because citizens expect its results to have a reasonable quality." Id. at 304
(emphasis in original).
26.

GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 4.

27.

Writing from a non-deliberative framework, Dunn states: "Governmental seclusion

is the most direct and also the deepest subversion of the democratic claim ....

The more

governments control what their fellow citizens can know the less they can claim the authority
of those citizens for how they rule." DUNN, supra note 16, at 185; see also John Dunn,
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Deliberative democracy theorists have described well the adverse
effects caused by the manipulation of information as a democracy
determines policy. Habermas argues elite monopolization of relevant
information distorts the communicative process, thereby preventing
further democratization. 28 Such monopolization involves far more than
withholding information,29 yet it is easy to see how secrecy can have a
distorting effect. As the public forms its positions, the government is
but one of several competitors for public attention and approval, and
given the malleability of public opinion formation, it can be argued that
the withholding of relevant information will have little effect on that
process-people will keep their opinions irrespective of facts. However,
except in some circumstances discussed below, it would seem unlikely
that participants in such a discourse would accept governmental failures
to disclose information that could impact opinion formation. On the
legislative level, decision-makers for the most part select and justify
policies that have already been "discovered" through interactions in the
public sphere. 30 At the same time, legislators rely on preparatory work
provided by the administration in this process of selection and
justification. 31 Again, these processes can be impacted by information
flows controlled in part by secrecy.
B. The Counterarguments
1. Secrecy and DemocraticIdeals
It is thus possible to argue that secrecy can be inimical to
democracy both as a means of achieving meaningful consent and as a
process through which a polity makes community decisions.
Nevertheless, although secrecy can pose a danger to democracy, it is
difficult to determine exactly when the danger is so great that secrecy
must be prohibited. First, as others have pointed out, on the substantive

Situating Democratic Political Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND
REPRESENTATION 329 (Adam Przeworski et. al. eds., 1999).
28. HABERMAS, supra note 25, at 318. Habermas, who relies on the work of Dahl on
this point, argues: "Privileged access to the sources of relevant knowledge makes possible an
inconspicuous domination over the colonized public of citizens cut off from these sources and
placated with symbolic politics." Id. at 317.
29. It also includes the setting of the public agenda and the uses of information to assist
an administration in steering the nation in particular directions.
30, HABERMAS, supra note 25, at 307.
31. Id.
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level, secrecy can be used to combat coercion. Oppressed groups often
need secrecy to strengthen group cohesion and to allow for mobilization
for action.32 The very act of forming democratic constitutions has
required secrecy. 33 More relevant to intelligence issues, if meaningful
consent depends on a government providing its citizenry with accurate
assessments of states of the world, what happens if the flow of
information needed for such accuracy dries up because the sources and
methods enabling that flow are disclosed and thereby evaded?
This means it is not always possible to apply a rule that would
prohibit as undemocratic secrecy that disables meaningful consent and to
permit secrecy that does not.
Sometimes decision-makers need
information to assess an evolving national security problem, but as just
discussed, they face the dilemma that disclosure of such information will
stop future flows of information needed to assess and respond to
subsequent evolutions of the same problem. This, of course, was what
confronted those who broke the Japanese diplomatic codes prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor.34 One could argue that it is more advantageous
from a democratic perspective to have a better-informed and therefore
more meaningful decision in the present, and risk losing information
32. Cass Sunstein points out that several social movements, such as the civil rights and
women's movements, were made possible by enclaves of marginalized persons who were then
able to form positions and strategies within those particular groups. CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 45-46 (2001).

33. Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
97, 109-11 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of publicity in
constitutional conventions).
34. By the eve of the United States' entry into the Second World War, U.S.
cryptanalysts had broken Japanese diplomatic codes. This, and the subsequent decryption of
Japanese naval codes, was an intelligence coup crucial to the war effort. HERVIE HAUFLER,
CODEBREAKER'S VICTORY: HOW THE ALLIED CRYPTOGRAPHERS WON WORLD WAR II 3-4

(2003). Important decisions were taken on the strength of intelligence derived from the
decoded intercepts, and of course, the source of that intelligence was highly classified. The
Japanese diplomatic code had been broken in 1940, before the attack on Pearl Harbor,
CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY: SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 105 (1995), and there were strong

indications from the intercepts that the Japanese leadership was contemplating war with the
United States.

Id. at 110, 113-14; see also HENRY C. CLAUSEN & BRUCE LEE, PEARL

HARBOR: FINAL JUDGMENT 42 (1992). Many factors contributed to the United States'
inability to anticipate and prevent the attack, but one, some argue, was the failure to
disseminate all relevant intercepts with those directly responsible for Pearl Harbor's defense,
in part to protect Magic. That claim is controversial. Compare CLAUSEN & LEE, supra, at
300-01 (arguing that the U.S. military commanders should have been amply warned by what
communications were provided to them) with GORDON W. PRANGE WITH DONALD M.
GOLDSTEIN & KATHERINE V. DILLON, PEARL HARBOR: THE VERDICT OF HISTORY 278

(1986) (arguing that not all important intercepts were shared).
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flows in the future. But a democracy could decide to accept the
possibility of incompletely-considered decisions now in hopes of a
better, and thus in some sense, freer and more meaningful decision, later.
But of course, there35 is then a risk that these deferrals in disclosure will
go on ad infinitum.
The difficulties in assessing when concealment is coercive raises a
second problem with equating the presence or absence of meaningful
consent with democratic and undemocratic uses of secrecy. So far, I
have evaluated secrecy through the lens of freedom from coercion; but
such freedom is just one of several principles-including equality,
accountability, and participation in decision-making-any of which
could be selected as a yardstick for evaluating uses of secrecy. One
could, for example, examine secrecy from the perspective of
participation and ask whether secrecy is being used to hinder or facilitate
such participation. However, my suspicion is that whether one singles
out one of these principles or views them as a whole, there are many
times when these concepts are too abstract-especially when melded to
the structures of modem democracy-to help determine how secrecy is
to be used.
2. Secrecy and Democratic Processes
As I discussed earlier, on the decision-making level, one can frame
arguments that secrecy is harmful to the process whereby a polity makes
community decisions. But deliberative democracy allows for other
kinds of decision-making, including those involving secrets, as long as
those other ways of deciding are justified in a deliberative process. This
point is made by Thompson, who argues that the problem of secrecy and
democracy is not that the two conflict, but rather, that democracies are
faced with a dilemma.36 As discussed in the Introduction, Thompson
argues that democracy requires publicity to hold leaders accountable for
their policy decisions, yet "some policies and processes, if they were
made public, could not be carried out as effectively or at all. ' 37
Faced with this dilemma, at the extremes a democracy can either
abandon the policy at issue or abandon accountability. Or, a democracy
can have both by "lifting the veil of secrecy just enough to allow for

35.
36.

I return to this problem in Part III, and in Part IV.
Thompson, supra note 1, at 182.

37.

Id.
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some degree of democratic accountability. '38 Thompson suggests two
ways to do so. The first is to lift the veil at some point to allow public
evaluation after the fact, to grant temporal secrecy. 39 But because
temporal secrecy is a form of secrecy, it runs the danger of reducing
accountability and consent. Thompson therefore suggests democracies
engage in a form of "second-order" publicity to determine whether
temporal secrecy should be granted. "[A] secret is justified only if it
promotes the democratic discussion of the merits of a public policy; and
if citizens and their accountable representatives are able to deliberate
about whether it does so. '' 40 However, according to Thompson, secondorder publicity has its limitations. It does not reach cases where
accountability is "context sensitive., 41 "These are cases in which the
controversial element of the policy is specific to the case, cannot be
revealed without undermining the policy, and has irreversible effects. 42
It also does not handle cases when second-order publicity about a policy
would undermine its first-order efficacy, when even a general discussion
of a policy would undermine its effectiveness. 43
The limitations of second-order publicity in certain situations
motivate a second way to deal with the secrecy dilemma: one can allow
"partial secrets." Thomson discusses three kinds. The first is what he
calls "acoustic separation." Here, Thompson uses as an example the old
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. He argues the maxim in
practice is untrue because there are several valid "defenses" based on
such ignorance; however, it is socially useful to maintain the maxim and
thus distance it from that "truth" about knowledge of the law.44 A
second form of partial secrecy is illustrated by the "don't ask, don't tell"
policy regarding gays in the military-a form of compelled silence.4 5
The third deals with political hypocrisy: sometimes it is useful not to
reveal potentially damaging personal information about elected leaders
because it has nothing to do with the merits of policies such leaders
might be advocating. 46

38.
39.

Id. at 183.
Id. at 184.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Thompson, supra note 1, at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Thompson, supra note 1, at 186.
Idat 188-90.

46.

Id. at 190-92.
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At best, however, partial secrets go only so far to resolve the
dilemma posed by the desire for both accountability and policies that
require secrecy; some policies will never be completely disclosed.
Thompson suggests: "The only feasible solutions seem to be either to
rely on representatives who can be trusted to review in private the policy
and its application, or to conduct public debates in general terms without
revealing the specific nature of the policy. ' 47 Thompson thus concedes
second-order publicity and partial secrets are incomplete solutions to the
dilemma. "That neither of these alternatives usually provides adequate
democratic accountability is a further reason to seek ways to promote
transparency in the 48
design of the government institutions and the making
of public policies.
The approaches proposed by Thompson are often taken in the
national security context, but with varying degrees of success.
Information is declassified over time, but this can happen decades after it
could be used to hold decision-makers accountable, let alone to help
decide a prospective policy. Accountability is also supposed to be
secured through a small number of Congressional committees charged
with oversight of the intelligence community, a kind of partial secrecy.
As is well known, however, such oversight is not without its problems.4 9
Finally, broad public debate about national security policy in general
terms can take place without revealing secrets.
However, such
discussion can be broad indeed and easily manipulated, thereby
providing little guidance or legitimizing force. This simply confirms
Thompson's point that temporary and partial secrecy are incomplete
solutions to the problems of accountability and consent raised when a
society wants to preserve democratic values at the same time it wants
effective policies. The possible conflict between secrecy and democracy
viewed as a set of principles is replaced by a deliberative dilemmadifficult, if not impossible, to resolve.
C. The Lessons of Democracyfor Secrecy
As discussed in Part II A, Dunn argues that democracy provides
first, a practical means for refusing to be ruled by unaccountable persons
for indefinite periods of time and against our will, and second, a

47.
48.
49.

Id. at 193.
Thompson, supra note 1, at 193.
See infra text accompanying notes 168-221.
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framework for considering questions of how we are to order ourselves as
a society. The foregoing discussion confirms that view in part, at least
when we ask whether democracy as an idea or as a framework for
decision-making guides our uses of secrecy. The ideas or values
commonly associated with democratic societies, whether realized or not,
and certain presumptions about what is required in democratic
deliberation do have the effect of drawing our attention to situations
where secrecy claims become enmeshed with those values or activities
and conflicts with them.
I argue later in Part IV that heightened attention, particularly in
light of some of the technical aspects of secrecy to support sources and
methods I am about to discuss, might be enough to provide some clarity
on how secrecy is used in some situations. However, such ideas, values,
and principles are not sufficient in themselves to inform when the
protection of sources and methods should give way to them. On the
level of ideas, values, or commonly held assumptions about the
individual, sometimes secrecy can simultaneously support and frustrate
those values. On the level of deliberation, secrecy can either impede or
facilitate reason-giving, and there is always the reality that citizens
legitimately want both accountability and effective policies and are
willing at times to compromise one in favor of the other. This leads to
second-best measures that only serve to highlight, not resolve, the
dilemma posed by those two sometimes conflicting desires. 50

50. Space does not permit a comparative study of secrecy in other democracies.
However, the United Kingdom's Official Secrets Act is well known. Official Secrets Act of
1989, 1989 c. 6. That act provides for criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosures of
official information of various kinds and has been used to prosecute persons who have
allegedly provided sensitive information to the press. See, e.g., Civil servant cleared as
secrets
case
dropped,
TIMES
ONLINE,
Jan.
9,
2008,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article3159398.ece
(describing a case
brought against a British Foreign Office civil servant for alleged breaches of the Official
Secrets Act by providing information to the media). For a history of the Act, see John
Griffith, The Official Secrets Act 1989, 16 J. L. & SoC'Y 273 (1989). The Act has had its own
troubled history and has been criticized as being in conflict with the freedom of expression
and preventing government accountability. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ABDICATION OF
RESPONSIBILITY: THE COMMONWEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 56-57 (1991), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/g/genera/general291o.pdf; LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & IAN
LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD: NATIONAL SECURITY AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 245

(1994). The Act, however, as well as other differences between U.S. and U.K. national
security policy and organization, indicates it is possible for democracies to have differing
approaches to the treatment of national security secrets. For a brief comparison of U.S. and
U.K. approaches to domestic security, see TODD MASSE, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE IN THE
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III. SECRECY To PROTECT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
A. The Need for Secrecy
At this point, it would seem that secrecy wins out in a contest with
democracy because of the amorphous character of the latter and its
power to guide. However, secrecy to protect sources and methods must
also be considered on its own merits.
Michael Herman discusses three reasons for secrecy in intelligence
activities. In wartime, secrecy hides from an adversary the fact that its
plans have been detected and are being countered. Here, that such plans
are known is crucial, not how they are known. 51 A second reason given
by Herman 52 is what Richard Posner terms the "embarrassment factor."
National security sometimes involves what at best can be termed
questionable practices; 53 there is the risk that intelligence gathering, if
disclosed, will jeopardize foreign relations. Thus emerges plausible
deniability. According to this theory, certain persons, including elected
leaders, should not know about certain intelligence activities because
they must be able to deny credibly knowledge of such activities.
The protection of sources and methods of intelligence collection
and analysis is the third and most important reason for secrecy.54 Such
sources and methods must be kept secret because they are vulnerable 5to6
55
Intelligence agents can be arrested and executed,
countermeasures.

U.K.: APPLICABILITY OF THE MI-5 MODEL TO THE U.S., CRS Report RL31920, at 6-11

(2003), availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31920.pdf.
51. MICHAEL HERMAN, INTELLIGENCE POWER IN PEACE AND WAR 88 (1996).
52. Id. at 88-89.

53. RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE
THROES OF REFORM 187 (2006).
54.

HERMAN, supra note 51, at 89 (stating that the main reason for secrecy is to protect

intelligence sources); ROBERT M. CLARK, INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: A TARGET-CENTRIC

APPROACH 96-97 (2004) (arguing that secrecy is important to protect sources and methods);
HOLT, supra note 4, at 73 ("The sources of intelligence and the methods used to acquire it are
possibly the most sensitive secrets of the intelligence community ....
"); MARK M.
LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 73 (3d ed. 2006) ("The details of
collection capabilities-and even the existence of some capabilities-are among the most
highly classified secrets of any state.").
55. HERMAN, supra note 51, at 89-90; see also CLARK, supra note 54, at 97 ("[A]lmost
every intelligence service has lost collection assets because an intelligence customer gave the
press information or acted in such a way that the collection source was 'blown."').
56. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 70-71 (describing instances where failure to protect
sources resulted in the deaths of secret agents).
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codes can be changed, 57 or persons can avoid using cell phones or email, or stay out of sight of reconnaissance satellites. Alternatively,
sources can be manipulated by an adversary to spread false information;
spies can be persuaded to become double agents, or false messages can
be given in encrypted transmissions.
At the outset, two points should be made about the need to protect
sources and methods through secrecy. As Herman notes, the main
concern is to ensure the availability and quality of future flows of
information, as opposed to current information.58 Problems arise when
the disclosure of current information threatens the flow of future
information because disclosure now could reveal its source. Further, the
need for such protection gives rise to a penumbra of principles,
practices, and institutions to preserve secrets: since the possibility of59
disclosure increases with the number of persons privy to information,
such information is limited to those who need to know. The protection
of sources and methods also requires a complex bureaucracy to decide
what information should be secret and who should have access to it. 60
B. The Protectionof Sources and Methods in Context
1. Knowledge and Vulnerability of Sources and Methods
All things equal, the argument for protecting sources and methods
of intelligence is persuasive. We tend to believe that more, not less,
information is necessary to make good judgments. Other countries and
entities do not always publicize their plans and intentions, thus we need
to gather and develop intelligence on our own. Furthermore, the sources
and methods for producing useful intelligence often involve human lives
and are expensive.
There are times, however, when the strength of the secrecy
argument wanes. Secrecy, for example, is not useful if the intelligence

57. This was the primary reason for keeping the sources of intelligence on Japanese
foreign and military policy secret. Stephen Budiansky, Closing the Book on PearlHarbor,24
CRYPTOLOGIA 119 (2000).
58. HERMAN, supra note 51, at 90.
59. Memorandum from Alfred Cumming, Specialist in Intelligence and Nat'l Security
Foreign Affairs, Def. and Trade Div., Statutory Procedures Under Which Congress is to be
Informed of U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including Covert Actions 9 (Jan. 18, 2006), available
at http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/crs 11806.pdf.
60. For a brief discussion of the legal framework for the system of classification and
access to confidential information, see LOWENTHAL, supra note 54, at 62-67.
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sources and methods at issue are already known, and here it bears
emphasizing that a significant amount of information about them is
readily available. Groupings vary, but in general, three disciplines are
used in the collection and development of information: 61 signals
intelligence,62 imagery intelligence, and human intelligence.63 Each of
these fields involves various kinds of technology and other resourcesthe details of which are not public-but it is possible to make educated
guesses about the capabilities of some of the sources and methods
employed in these fields.64 For example, in the area of signals
intelligence, it is widely believed that the U.S. intelligence community,
together with foreign agencies, has broad capacities to intercept
electronic communications taking place anywhere in the world.65
Amateur observers have identified and tracked the paths of spy

61. Intelligence gathering and dissemination are sometimes understood as a cycle of
planning and directing intelligence resources to answer specific questions; collecting raw
intelligence; processing, producing and analyzing such raw intelligence into finished
intelligence useful for policymakers; and disseminating it to relevant "consumers." JOHNSON,
supranote 4, at 76. Others view the process as more interactive and spontaneous than a cycle:
each "stage" continuously impacts what goes on in other stages, and there is, or should be,
close collaboration between intelligence "producers" and "consumers." See, e.g., CLARK,
supra note 54 (advocating a more collaborative model of deriving actionable intelligence).
Wilhelm Agrell is critical of the concept of the intelligence cycle and advocates its disposal.
In his view, the concept works fairly well for handling mass data, but does not serve as a good
model for problem-solving. TOWARD A THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE 21 (Gregory F. Treverton
et
al.
eds.
2006)
(Remarks
of
Wilhelm
Agrell),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conCfproceedings/2006/RANDCF219.pdf.
62. Under this discipline are the sub-disciplines of communications intelligence,
electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence.
63. RICHARD A. BEST, JR., INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, CRS report
RL33539, at 4 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33539.pdf.
64. These guesses are often aided by media reports, which are sometimes followed by
confirmations by the government. The disclosure of the Administration's interception of
communications between persons in the United States and abroad is a case in point. See
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005 at A 1 (reporting based on information gained from government sources that the
President ordered the intercepts); Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for
National
Intelligence
(Dec.
19,
2005)
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-I.html
(confirming general
aspects of program).
65. See JAMES BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS: ANATOMY OF THE ULTRA-SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FROM THE COLD WAR THROUGH THE DAWN OF A NEW
CENTURY 354-418 (2001) (discussing the development of signals intelligence and
international efforts to intercept telecommunications).
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satellites.6 6 Moreover, intelligence from publicly available sources has
become an important, albeit non-exclusive, component of intelligence
development. 67
To a lesser extent, the need for secrecy also depends on the
vulnerability of a source or method to countermeasures. It is unlikely
that any source is completely invulnerable to detection or evasion, but
Herman points out there are some differences in the "fragility" of
sources. 68 Intelligence gained from breaking codes is particularly
vulnerable to countermeasures because codes can be changed.
Intelligence gathered through imagery, however, is less fragile: satellites
can be countered through camouflaging techniques, but eventually large
scale developments, such as troop movements, must happen in the
open. 69 Gregory Treverton speculates that world events also have an
impact on vulnerability.7 ° According to Treverton, during the Cold War,
intelligence was dependent on a relatively small number of collectors so
that the exposure of one was very damaging. He writes, "Arguably, that
,,71
is less so now with many, varied targets and much more information.

66. The Visual Satellite Observer Home Page identifies and discusses several
surveillance satellites. Spy Satellites, http://www.satobs.org/spysat.htmi (last visited Sept. 2,
2008); Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) Double and Triple Satellite Formations,
http://www.satobs.org/noss.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).
67. Loch K. Johnson, Spies, 120 FOREIGN POL'Y 18, 22-23 (2000). Johnson estimated
that "[d]uring the Cold War, about 85 percent of the information contained in espionage
reports came from the public domain." Id. at 22. Writing in 2000, he estimated that 90 to 95
percent of such information comes from public sources. Id. Johnson nevertheless argues
open source intelligence will never eliminate the need for human intelligence. Id. at 22-23.
For a general discussion of intelligence sources and collection, see CLARK, supra note 54, at
63-96.
68. HERMAN, supra note 51, at 71, 90. Within signals intelligence, for example, the
surveillance of electronic emissions is less vulnerable than the surveillance of
communications. Id.
69. Id. at 90. According to Clark, clandestine communications intelligence, often
derived from wiretaps, is the most highly protected source, with decrypted messages coming
second. CLARK, supra note 54, at 96. At the same time, imagery intelligence has very little
protection because information needs to be provided quickly to persons in the field and an
adversary is aware satellites are being used. Id. at 96-97. Public sources are not protected but
the methods for deriving intelligence from them are. Id. at 97.
70.

See GREGORY F. TREVERTON, THE NEXT STEPS IN RESHAPING INTELLIGENCE

(2005), availableat http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional-papers/2005/RANDOPI 52.pdf.
71. Id. at 28. This leads Treverton to propose changes to the "need to know" policy to
aid in the dissemination of information. Id. at 27. With regard to imagery, adversaries have
learned to avoid detection by conducting activities underground or masking activities in
buildings with no obvious indications of what is taking place inside them. JORDAN TAMA,
THE PRINCETON PROJECT ON NAT'L SEC., INTELLIGENCE REFORM: PROGRESS, REMAINING
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The public availability of general (and sometimes, quite detailed)
information about sources and methods, as well as differences in their
fragility, drain some strength from the secrecy argument. A rational
adversary with access to publicly available information will make his
own guesses about the capabilities of intelligence collection, or presume
the worst. He will assume any electronic communication will be
intercepted; every effort will be made to decrypt coded communications
and will eventually succeed; his movements will be observed via
satellite; any electronic funds transfers will be traced; and at some point,
his organization will be infiltrated by foreign agents.12 Since some
forms of information do not reveal anything about sources or methods
that an adversary does not already know or assume to be true, at a
minimum it should be possible to have public debate about the general
features of national security policy. 73 Moreover, if some sources are in
fact less fragile than others, it should be possible in some cases to have a
quite detailed debate using intelligence obtained from sources that are
relatively robust.
There are, however, two responses to this argument. First,
adversaries make mistakes. The Japanese military never realized its
wartime codes had been broken, even though there was evidence to that
effect.
Second, the problem becomes more complex if one moves
from the broad brushstrokes of national security policy to finer detail.
Information about the effectiveness of a particular surveillance program
would obviously be useful in a debate about whether to start the program
in the first place or later to continue it, but at the same time such
information would alert an adversary to the limitations of that program

DEFICIENCIES,

AND

NEXT

STEPS

18-19

(2005),

available

at

http://www.princeton.edu/-ppns/papers/intel-reform.pdf.
72. See Mark Sappenfield & Mark Clayton, How media leaks affect war on terror,
CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jun. 30,
2006, at USA Section, available at
http://www.csmonitor.comI/2006/0630/p02s01-usfp.html (reporting how some intelligence
experts assume terrorists are aware of various forms of electronic monitoring reported by the
press).
73.

DAVID M. BARRETT, THE CIA AND CONGRESS: THE UNTOLD STORY FROM

TRUMAN TO KENNEDY 95 (2005). Sometimes, adversaries do not have to guess U.S.
intentions; in 1951, Congress publicly authorized $100 million for covert operations against
the Soviet Union. Id. at 103.
74. ANDREW, supra note 34, at 137-38 (discussing use of information from intercepts to
assassinate Admiral lsoroku Yamamoto); ABRAM N. SHULSKY & GARY J. SCHMITT, SILENT
WARFARE: UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD OF INTELLIGENCE 46 (3rd ed. 2002) (noting that

after the Battle of Midway, the Chicago Tribune published materials derived from decoded
messages).
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and provide ways to circumvent it. Or it may be that finished
information can be attributed to only one or two sources of raw
information, or is dependent on a web of sources, some of which are
open or robust, others of which are fragile.75 We are thus at the point
where Thompson's dilemma, that sometimes it is not possible to have
both effective policy and full accountability at the same time, becomes
most salient.7 6 However, as I discuss more fully below, these
considerations do not take away from the sense that, given the
information on intelligence sources and methods already available, some
forms of democratic debate are possible. Moreover, we are able to frame
better questions of both those who hold secret information and those
who oversee them.
2. The Limitations of Intelligence and its Role in Public Policy
Decisions
Like Russian dolls, secrecy to protect sources and methods nests
within the collection and development of useful intelligence, which in
turn nests within the development of national security policy-just one
of several areas important to the United States. It follows that the value
of sources and methods and the need to protect them depends in part on
the value of the intelligence derived from them, which in turn depends
on how important intelligence is in the formation of national security
policy. The value of both can be modest.
a. Intelligence as Educated Guess
As an initial matter, it is worth considering what one means by
intelligence. The definition of intelligence is subject to debate, some of
which goes to whether intelligence differs from information in general,
whether the term should also encompass covert operations, and so

75.
At the same time, an overemphasis on particular kinds of sources and methods
might lead to biased judgments. Jennifer Sims argues: "There is . . . an analytical bias
towards intelligence that comes with higher classification . .
. The sensitivity of the
collection method, a key determinant of classification, does not necessarily correlate with the
quality of the product." TOWARD A THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE 23, 23 (Gregory F. Treverton
et. al. eds. 2006) (Remarks of Jennifer Sims). She states: "Assuming good intelligence
involves information collected principally through secret means renders the United States
particularly vulnerable to manipulation and deception." Id.
76.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-49.
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forth. 77 Kristan Wheaton and Michael Beerbower define intelligence as
"a process, focused externally and using information from all available
sources, that is designed to reduce the level of uncertainty for a
decisionmaker. ' ' 78 As Clark points out, such definitions imply that what
constitutes meaningful intelligence depends entirely on the user of
intelligence and her needs. 7 9 Another implication is that some kinds of
intelligence will be of legitimate interest to citizens and their
representatives and others will not. In most cases, it is not obvious why
citizens should have access to information about specific details about a
source or method; for example, the identity of a foreign agent, the design
of equipment used to detect radioactive emissions from a nuclear
weapons test, or the specific algorithms used in data-mining. Nor is it
obvious why the public should have access to tactical information like
troop movements.
However, if scholars like Wheaton and Beerbower are correct, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the ultimate purpose of intelligence is
to help decision-makers make wise choices by reducing uncertainty. In
fulfilling that primary mission, the only thing the intelligence
community can do to reduce uncertainty is to make guesses-educated
guesses about current and future states of the world, but guesses
nonetheless-fraught with difficulty and naturally prone to "failure." As
Richard Best explains, first, "hostile foreign countries and groups work
hard to mask their capabilities and intentions., 80 Second, "many factors
are inherently unforeseeable."' 81 Third, "intelligence agencies do not
always perform at maximum effectiveness., 82 Steps can be taken to
minimize these problems, and the litany of intelligence failures should
be accompanied by the litany of successes, 83 but in the end, it is

77. CLARK, supra note 54, at 13-14; LOWENTHAL, supra note 54, at 1-10.
78. Kristan J. Wheaton & Michael T. Beerbower, Towards a New Definition of
Intelligence, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 319, 329 (2006).
79. CLARK supra note 54 at 13.
80.

RICHARD A. BEST, JR., U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND POLICYMAKING:

THE IRAQ

at
1-2
(2005),
available at
EXPERIENCE,
CRS
Report
RS21696,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS21696.pdf. For a good discussion of what can go awry in
the intelligence cycle, see JOHNSON, supranote 4, at 76-99.
81. BEST, supra note 80, at 2.
82. Id. On organizational pressures on analysis, see e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Analysts &
Policymakers:A Confusion of Roles?, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 241, 262 (2006) (discussing
internal pressures within the intelligence community to conform).
83.
These successes include the CIA's judgment during the 1950s and early 1960s that
the USSR was not planning to start a war with the United States. BARRETT, supra note 73, at
462.
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unrealistic
to expect the intelligence community to prevent all Pearl
84
Harbors.

The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear
intentions and capabilities, a version of which was released to the
public,85 confirms the nature of the intelligence analysis of interest to
policymakers. NIEs are intended to be the intelligence community's
"most authoritative written judgments on national security issues.",8 6
They describe current information and "make judgments about the likely
87
course of future events and identify the implications for US policy."
The intelligence community is quite candid about the limitations of
such judgments and about the role evidence plays in reaching them:
We use phrases such as we judge, we assess, and we estimate-and
probabilistic terms such as probably and likely-to convey analytical
assessments and judgments.
Such statements are not facts, proof, or
knowledge.
These assessments and judgments generally are based on
collected information, which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some
assessments are based on previous judgments. In all cases, assessments and
judgments are not intended to imply that we have "proof'88 that shows
something to be a fact or that definitely links two items or issues.

With respect to assessing the likelihood of developments or events,
the NIE uses phrases along a continuum of certainty from "remote,"
"very unlikely," "unlikely," "even chance," "probably," "likely," "very
likely," to "almost certainly., 89 The NIE also ascribes "high,"
"moderate," and "low" confidence levels to their judgments based on the
scope and quality of information relevant to the intelligence

84. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones views what he calls an "obsession" with crisis-prevention as
peculiar to U.S. intelligence. RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, THE CIA & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
249 (3d ed. 2003).
85. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COUNCIL, IRAN: NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/press-releases/20071203_release.pdf

[hereinafter 2007 IRAN NIE].
86. Id. at 3. The U.S. intelligence community was restructured under the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified
in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). For a general description of the structure of the
community after 2004, see LOWENTHAL, supra note 54, at 30-53.
87. 2007 IRAN NIE, supra note 85, at 3.
88. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
89. Id.
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community's judgments. 9° According to the NIE, high confidence
"generally indicates that [the intelligence community's] judgments are
based on high-quality information, and/or that the nature of the issue
makes it possible to render a solid judgment." 91 Moderate confidence
"generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible
but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a
higher level of confidence. 92 Finally, low confidence "generally means
that the information's credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, or
that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make
solid analytic inferences, or that [the intelligence community has]
significant concerns or problems with the sources." 93 These remarks
confirm, as L. Britt Snider puts it, that even the most considered and
objective assessment of the intelligence community reflects a collective
which in nature is an educated opinion and nothing more or
judgment,
4
less.

9

The question arises what difference the opinion-like nature of
important forms of intelligence makes on the need to protect the sources
of information upon which those opinions are based. On the one hand, it
could be argued it makes no difference at all. No one expects us to
abandon intelligence activities simply because their end products are
opinions; people rely on expert opinions all the time and believe on
balance that they are much better than none at all. On the other hand,
because the end products are assessments, it is perfectly appropriate for
their recipients to ask about the bases of the various conclusions reached
by the intelligence community. Indeed, it has been argued that
policymakers misuse intelligence estimates if they take such assessments
as infallible. Snider quotes a member of Congress as saying: "The real

90. Id. The NIE, however, immediately qualifies this statement by pointing out that a
[S]uch judgments still carry a
judgment of high confidence "is not a fact or a certainty ....
risk of being wrong." 2007 IRAN NIE, supra note 85, at 5.

91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.

94.

L. Britt Snider, Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of

Intelligence, in INTELLIGENCE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIST:

ENDURING

ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 85, 98 (Roger Z. George & Robert D. Kline eds., 2006); see also
CYNTHIA M. GRABO, ANTICIPATING SURPRISE: ANALYSIS FOR STRATEGIC WARNING 13

(2002) ("Policymakers must recognize that warning cannot be issued with absolute certainty,
even under the best of circumstances, but will always be an assessment of probabilities.");
Mark Mazzetti, With New Data, U.S. Revises Its View of Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, at
A12 (discussing how various changes in assessing the reliability of certain intelligence
sources led to discarding some sources used in an NIE on Iran issued in 2005).
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problem is, Members [of Congress] don't spend enough time probing
what they hear from the Intelligence Community. If they spent more
time analyzing what they were hearing, they would know more what
needs to be fleshed out in order to make their own judgments."9 5
Consider how a decision-maker, who is being told by the
intelligence community that its predictive judgments should not be taken
as infallible, might go about making her own judgment about a national
security matter. Suppose the intelligence community is moderately
confident about an adversary's plans. The decision-maker could simply
take the fact of moderate confidence at face value. However, it seems
more consistent with the intelligence community's own characterization
of its products for the decision-maker to ask questions; for example,
whether there are competing theories among the various intelligence
agencies which leads to moderate confidence. Eventually, such an
inquiry could lead to a discussion of a particular source and why one
agency has greater confidence in that source while another does not.
Would it then be acceptable for secret-holders to tell that decision-maker
to reach her own conclusions and withhold information necessary to do
SO?96 In that situation, one cannot expect to enjoy the protection gained
by acknowledging the necessarily speculative nature of one's
assessments without allowing others to assess the factual bases of those
speculations.
b. The "Facts" as one Factoramong Many
A proper assessment of the need to protect sources and methods
involves not only understanding the tentative nature of the intelligence
derived from them, but also understanding the role intelligence plays in
the formation of foreign and national security policy. Lowenthal argues:
"[I]ntelligence exists solely to support policy makers." 97
Yet,
95. Snider, supra note 94, at 98.
96. Of course, the problem becomes trivial if finished intelligence products do not
jeopardize sources and methods. See CLARK, supra note 54, at 96 ("[U]sually the product is
accorded less protection than the sources and methods . . . [because] the product, if lost,
reveals only itself and not how it was obtained."). Wheaton and Beerbower argue that if
intelligence is defined in part with respect to the policymakers for whom intelligence is
developed and furnished, the need for secrecy, although not completely eliminated, is
curtailed. Wheaton & Beerbower, supra note 78, at 329. Such a definition, in their view,
would still require operational secrecy to protect sources and methods, but "[o]nce a decision
has been made and an action carried out (without, of course, divulging sensitive sources and
methods, particularly human sources), the need for secrecy is largely obviated." Id.
97. LOWENTHAL, supra note 54, at 2.
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intelligence is only one of several factors policymakers take into account
when deciding: others include an assessment of the costs and benefits of
a particular policy, geopolitical objectives, available resources, and
diplomatic and domestic risks, including political risks. 98 As a result,
"[e]ven when official justifications for a chosen course of action
highlight the conclusions of intelligence estimates, there are usually
multiple factors involved." 99
Intelligence is thus rarely the sole or determinative factor in public
decision-making. Further, even when it plays a leading role, the
correlation between intelligence and good policy can be weak.
"Intelligence may be good or bad and policies may be goodor bad, but
in the real world good policy may be made in the absence of perfect
intelligence and sound intelligence may not preclude making poor
policy." 100 This is true in part because, as Abram Shulsky and Gary
Schmitt put it, "Intelligence information and analyses will most likely
support arguments both for and against any proposed policy ....
The public release in December, 2007 of the NIE on Iran's nuclear
intentions and capabilities illustrates the complex relationship between
intelligence and policymaking. 10 2 Whether Iran is developing nuclear
weapons is of crucial concern. The 2007 NIE concluded with high
confidence that in fall 2003, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program,
but with moderate-to-high confidence that it is keeping open the option
to develop nuclear weapons. 103 It also concluded that Iran had halted its

98.

BEST, supra note 80, at 1.

99.

Id.

100. Id. On the difficulties in crafting effective foreign or national security policy in
general, see Richard K. Betts, Is Strategy an Illusion?, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 2000, at 5
(discussing the difficulties in deciding whether to use military force to achieve political ends).
There is a broad collection of literature on the impact of cognitive heuristics on public opinion
about foreign policy and on the formation of foreign policy. See, e.g., Paul R. Brewer et. al.,
International Trust and Public Opinion about World Affairs, 48 AM J. POL. Sci. 93 (2004);
Paul Goren, PoliticalSophisticationand Policy Reasoning: A Reconsideration, 48 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 462 (2004) (discussing the impact of beliefs on sophisticated and unsophisticated persons
in their preferences for military spending); Josh Kerbel, Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in
the US Debate about China (2004), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-thePhilip E.
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vo48no3/article3.htm;
Tetlock, Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World
Politics:Are We Prisonersof Our Preconceptions?,43 AM. J. POL. SCi. 335 (1999) (arguing
that even experts cope with the complexities and ambiguities of world politics by resorting to
theory-driven heuristics).
101.
SHULSKY & SCHMITT, supra note 74, at 136.
102. 2007 IRAN NIE, supra note 85.
103. Id. at 9.
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1°4
program because of pressure from the international community.
These results in 2007 contrasted with an earlier NIE issued in 2005
05
which found that Iran had not halted nuclear weapons development.'
The 2007 report quickly became the center of controversy, as
policymakers opposed to military intervention in Iran used the report to
argue that economic sanctions against Iran were being effective, while
others criticized the report as inaccurate or incomplete, in part because it
did not focus on nuclear fuel enrichment, while still others debated
whether the report's very release was helpful or harmful to U.S. foreign

policy. 106

"Everyone accepts the utility of intelligence as part of the bases
upon which decisions are made."' 1 7 However, if intelligence is at best
one of several factors that contribute to policy decisions, and is subject
to being discounted or ignored (particularly when controversial issues
are involved), and if sometimes the link between intelligence and good
policymaking is weak, the question arises whether the marginal benefits
gained from that intelligence (and by implication the secrets used to
protect its production), are worth their price in all contexts.
3. Secrecy and the PrecautionaryPrinciple
Thus far I have examined the sources and methods argument for
secrecy within the context of intelligence and policymaking. It is also
important to examine the argument for its logical coherence. One
problem in this respect is that it is often closely linked to the
precautionary principle, which can lead to paralysis in certain situations.
The precautionary principle dictates it is better to be safe than sorry. It
is embodied in international environmental instruments, such as the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Rio
Declaration, both of which provide that scientific uncertainty about
environmental issues should not prevent states from responding to those

104.
105.
106.
FOR

Id.
Id.
See

George

Perkovich,

INTERNATIONAL

Assessing
PEACE,

the

NIE,

CARNEGIE

ENDOWMENT

(Dec.

4,

2007),

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfin?fa-view&id=19747
(evaluating
the 2007 NIE and discussing its implications for future U.S. responses to Iran); see also
Steven Lee Myers, An Assessment Jars a Foreign Policy Debate About Iran, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2007, at A I (discussing various reactions to the assessment).
107. LOWENTHAL, supra note 54, at 177.
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issues. 108 Its usefulness is apparent in the international response to
climate change via the Kyoto Protocol, which requires reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions, even though the Protocol was drafted when
there was some uncertainty whether human activity impacts climate
change.' 0 9 Subsequent research has since led to broad consensus on the
issue. 110
Cass Sunstein points out, however, that in many situations the
precautionary principle provides no guidance whatsoever because it
works only when at least one of the available choices is risk-free."i '
Suppose someone must decide between action and inaction with regard
to a particular matter. If action runs a risk of harm and refraining from
action does not, the choice is obvious. But in most cases risk is involved
whether one acts or not. Unless one can quantify and balance the
potential risks of action and inaction, the precautionary principle leads to
deadlock: it dictates it is better to act than be sorry, and at the same time,
it dictates it is better not to act than be sorry.
At times, the sources and methods argument can take on the logical
form of the precautionary principle. A holder of information must
decide whether to disclose information derived from a combination of
sources and methods or keep it secret. The principle advises against
disclosure if there is a risk it would lead to the discovery of the
underlying sources or methods. But the failure to disclose might also
create a risk of discovery. Sharing information about particular troop
movements so they can be intercepted could cause an adversary to
conclude its codes have been broken. However, failing to share such
information may allow the same troops to capture personnel, documents,
or equipment that will lead the adversary to reach the same conclusion.
As one moves from these tactical situations to more strategic decisions,
3, May 9,
108. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3,
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 170; United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (June 14, 1992).
109. Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-cautionary
Principle,96 GEO. L. J. 445, 456-57 (2008).
110. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (2007), available at
http://www.aaas.org/news/press-room/climate-change/media/4th-spm2febO7.pdf (concluding
with "very high confidence," that human activities have led to global warming). Lisa
Heinzerling argues that there was much less scientific uncertainty about global warming when
the Rio Declaration was issued. Heinzerling, supra note 109, at 457.
111.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, 2634 (2005).
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the merits of the precautionary principle become even more tenuous
because, as discussed above, intelligence sources and methods are not
ends in themselves, but must be placed in the larger context of
intelligence production and the uses of intelligence in policymaking.
There, the precautionary principle leads nowhere because mirrored
against the risk that disclosure will harm society is the risk that failure to
disclose now will lead to ill-considered decisions that will harm it even
more.
4. Secrecy and the Impacts of Information Asymmetries
Finally, it is important to recall the impact of secrets in general on
decision-making. By definition, secrets create information asymmetries,
causing inefficiencies that have been well described in the literature. 112
Disparities in knowledge create two problems: adverse selection and the
moral hazard. Adverse selection arises when a party with less
information does not trust the party with more and thus does not enter
what would have been a mutually beneficial transaction. The moral
hazard arises because a party with less information does not know
whether the party with more is acting in the former party's interests.
Because asymmetries often result in inefficiencies, it is important to
trace the possible dynamics of using secrets to protect sources and
methods, both the dynamics specific to intelligence, and those that relate
to secrets in government more generally, particularly when such
asymmetries exist in bureaucracies and other institutions.
As was true with the breaking of the Japanese diplomatic codes, in
many respects, the problem of secrecy to protect sources and methods is
one of dissemination. When should information be shared and when
should it be kept secret, given that any time information is shared there

112. The pioneering work was begun by scholars such as Kenneth Arrow and George
Akerlof. See, e.g., George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963). For examples of how
information asymmetries operate in politics, including a discussion of the incentives that
information asymmetries create in committee structures, see David Austin-Smith & William
H. Riker, Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
897 (1987); Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules:
Some Amendments, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 435 (2001). For a review of the literature on
sensitive information from the perspective of economics, psychology, sociology, etc., see E.
Dale Thompson & Michelle L. Kaarst-Brown, Sensitive Information: A Review and Research
Agenda, 56 J. AM. SOC'Y INFORMATION SCI.& TECH. 245 (2005).
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is a risk the underlying sources and methods will be revealed? 113
Someone must decide whether the benefits of disclosure outweigh the
potential harm. The benefits of such disclosure could be measured by
the magnitude of harm that might be avoided, or the strategic or tactical
advantage that might be gained from disclosure, discounted by the
possibility that such disclosure will have little or no impact on a
decision-maker. The variables that go to the risks of disclosure include
an assessment of the availability of alternative sources of information,
the vulnerability of the source involved, and the value of future
information flows from that source, which, in turn, depends on the
anticipated persistence of a particular threat or national security
situation.
It goes without saying; each of these assessments is inexact. The
real problem arises, however, when one asks who is in a better position
to make these assessments. As between the information holder and the
potential recipient, the information holder is probably better positioned
to assess the availability of alternate sources of information and the
vulnerability of sources to detection and countermeasures. However, the
potential recipient is in the better position to assess whether the
information in question, or the information that might be provided to her
in the future, is or will be useful. The problem is that the information
holder makes that decision for her. As a result, the information holder
always runs the risk of providing too much or too little information to
the potential recipient. The problem can be ameliorated to some extent
by communication between the holder and the recipient, but it never
completely disappears.
The amount of disclosure required can be context-specific. James
Steinberg argues that counter-terrorism requires a more open system
where information is shared among a broader set of actors, because4
potential targets are diffuse and attacks take place on the local level.l1
In his view, the security structure built in response to the Cold War is illfitted for this new climate. 1 5 That architecture placed a high premium
on information security and included tight background checks, rigid
compartmentalization, and allowed the agency that developed a

113. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
114. Intelligence and Nat ' Sec. Policy: Hearing Before the Nat'l Comm 'n on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the U.S. (Oct. 14, 2003) (statement of James B. Steinberg, Vice President &
Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing4/witness steinberg.htm.

115.

Id.
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particular item of information to control its dissemination. 1 16 "This
system assumed that it was possible to know a priori who 'needed to
know' and that the risk of inadvertent or malicious disclosure was
greater than the benefit from wider information sharing."'1 7 There have
been some attempts at reform, but the problem remains large and
intractable. 118
In this regard, the system Steinberg complains of is immense and
expensive. In Fiscal Year 2005, for example, various agencies classified
about 14.2 million items of information as top secret, secret, or
confidential. 119 That same year information security activities cost

116. Id.
117. Id.; see also CLARK, supra note 54, at 98 ("The major penalty compartmentalization
imposes on the intelligence business is that it restricts critical review of the analytic
product."). The 9/11 Commission attributes the failure to recognize or take advantage of these
opportunities to a number of factors, many dealing with the failure to share information.
NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT
353,
355-56
(2004),
available
at
http://www.9Sllcommission.gov/report/911 Report.pdf [hereinafter THE 9/1l COMMISSION REPORT]. In
another example, Laura Donohue argues that practical cooperation on the international level
to prevent the funding of terrorist organizations is impeded by government reluctance to share
evidence with other states to substantiate why certain individual's and entities' assets should
be blocked, out of a fear of disclosing sources and methods. Laura K. Donohue, AntiTerroristFinance in the UK. & U.S., 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303, 381 (2006); see also HOUSE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE, JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE
AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S.Rep. No. 107-351 & H.R.
Rep. No. 107-792, at xvii (2002) [hereinafter SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT]
(finding that the failure of the CIA to recognize significant information being collected about
potential terrorist activity led in turn to a failure to take precautions that might have prevented
the attacks).
118. In response to concerns about the failure of agencies to share relevant information,
the government proposed a series of initiatives known as the Federal Enterprise Architecture,
which are designed to improve information-sharing among agencies. For a description and
critical evaluation of the program, see Peng Liu & Amit Chetal, Trust-Based Secure
Information Sharing Between Federal Government Agencies, 56 J. AM. SOC'Y INFO. SCI. &
TECH. 283 (2005). Provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
provide for greater horizontal sharing of intelligence among agencies. 6 U.S.C.A. § 485
(West 2008). The President followed the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission for
greater information sharing through executive order. Exec. Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg.
53599 (Aug. 27, 2004).
119. INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COST ESTIMATES FOR
SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION
ACTIVITIES
FOR
2005,
3
(2005),
available at
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2005-cost-report.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON COST
ESTIMATES] This represented a nine percent decrease from 2004, but the ISOO states it
remains cautious as to whether this represents a trend. Id.
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approximately $7.7 billion. 120 There may be so many secrets that it is
impossible to track them all, let alone evaluate whether information
should continue to remain secret. The result is a bias in favor of secrecy
to play it safe, thus resulting in an increasing amount of classified
information. And because a large number of government agencies
produce such information, huge coordination problems arise, which in
turn are exacerbated by interagency rivalries endemic to any
bureaucracy. Secrecy becomes2 it own justification, unmoored from any
valid reasons for its existence.' '
Joseph Stiglitz identifies four reasons why the government is
unable to craft policies that result in Pareto improvements. 12 2 First, the
government is unable to make credible commitments because it can
always change its mind. 123 This inability to make commitments creates
another set of inefficiencies, which is the "cost of creating next-best
credibility-enhancing mechanisms." ' 124 Second, because of imperfect
information, bargaining results in inefficient outcomes, and since
policymakers know bargaining is a dynamic process, some will hold out
and wait for a better deal in subsequent rounds. 125 Third, Stiglitz argues
destructive competition exists where political competitors raise the costs
of their opponents. 126
Fourth, people lack knowledge of the
consequences of change and misunderstand the nature of policy
decisions; politicians mistakenly believe they are in a zero-sum game.121
"[T]here is often a generalized skepticism about proposals offered by an
adversary that leads politicians to think that anytime an adversary makes
28
a proposal, it must involve the adversary benefiting at their expense." 1
120. Id. at 2-3. These costs included those incurred for personnel security, physical
security, information security, professional training, and security management and planning.
Id. at 1-2. Cost estimates from the CIA are not included because that information is classified.
REPORT ON COST ESTIMATES, supra note 119, at 3.
121.
The irony is that the large number of secrets, coupled with modem communications
technology, such as electronic mail, increases the likelihood secrets will be disclosed.
122. Joseph Stiglitz, The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions, 12
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 2, 7-15 (1998).

123.

Id. at8-11.

124. Id. at 10. These are strategies designed to make it costly for the government to
change its mind. According to Stiglitz, such strategies raise transaction costs, which makes
change difficult, thereby preventing Pareto improvements. Id.
125. Stiglitz, supra note 122, at 11-12.
126. Id. at 12-13. For Stiglitz, destructive competition arises under conditions of
imperfect competition in which firms gain an advantage not by producing a better product at
lower cost, but by raising the costs of its competitors. Id.
127. Id. at 13-14.
128. Stiglitz, supra note 122, at 13.
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In Stiglitz's view, secrecy exacerbates these problems in several
ways. 129 Those who were barred from the commitment process on
grounds of secrecy are justified in trying to change the outcome, because
30
they have no reason to trust that their interests were considered.
Indeed, it is unlikely the interests of those excluded from the process
will be considered as fully as those included, which increases the
incentives of excluded groups to overturn the results of the process. 131
As a related matter, secrecy worsens the costs of positional goods and
destructive competition in government. 32
"It short-circuits the
consensus process and makes it more likely that outcomes will lead to a
greater divergence between winners and losers."' 133
"Third," he
continues, "by making information scarce, it contributes both to the
perception and reality of asymmetrical information, and puts into play a
dynamic which is more likely to lead to biased and unrealistic
information."'' 34 As Stiglitz puts it: "In a world of secrecy, you will
always suspect that some interest group is taking advantage of the
",,35
secrecy to advance their causes over yours. ...
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones puts the matter this way:
In keeping certain information hidden from foreign powers, the director of
the CIA must necessarily refrain from instructing (and may even actively
deceive) the American people and all but a few of their elected representatives.
But as dissimulation is a well-known strategy of the shadier type of politician,
and as it might also signify an attempt by a particular president to expand his
powers at the expense of Congress, arguments about the need for secrecy often
meet with a cynical reception.

Jeffreys-Jones uses the term "dissimulation," but one need not go
that far to understand that administrations can use secrecy to engage in
what Habermas calls "steering."' 37 The role secret intelligence plays in

129. Id. at 15.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Stiglitz, supra note 122, at 15.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. JEFFREYS-JONES, supra note 84, at 3.
137. Pat Holt argues that the Reagan administration exaggerated intelligence reports from
Central America to support its policies there. According to Holt, the congressional oversight
committees were aware of these exaggerations but were constrained from revealing them for
security reasons. Similarly, the Johnson administration misrepresented the encounter between
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decision-making becomes more complex because of the ways in which
information can be used through framing, persuasion, and media
priming 11 8 to manipulate people into assenting to public policies. An
argument that secrecy is needed to protect sources and methods might
have no basis in reality, or it might be just one of several reasons why
the government might want to keep a particular item of information
secret. Secrecy can of course be used to cover up activities or mistakes
that would be criticized by the public. Stiglitz argues, for example, that
secrecy in government most often "serves as a cloak behind which
special interests can most effectively advance their interests, outside of
public scrutiny."' 139 Many have argued national security concerns rarely
motivate most government secrets. 140
One result is that government can shift the costs of inaccurate or
incomplete information from itself to the larger society. Sometimes this
shift is obvious. For example, until legislation was enacted in 2007, the
annual budget for the intelligence community was classified, known
only to the executive branch, select members of Congress, and high
officials in the intelligence community, and even under the new law, the
President can waive public disclosure of the budget on national security
grounds. 141 A secret budget makes it possible for the government to

the United States and North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, which led in part to passage of the
Tonkin Resolution. HOLT, supra note 4, at 14.
138. See generally James M. Druckman, On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who can
Frame?,63 J. POL 1041 (2001) (discussing the limitations of the framing effect).
139. Stiglitz, supra note 122, at 16.
140. See, e.g., id. at 15-16; see also United States v. N.Y. Times Co. et. al., No. 71 Civ.
2662, 1971 WL 224067, 17 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 17, 1971) (Frankel Aff.).
[T]he Government and its officials regularly and routinely misuse and
abuse the "classification" of information, either by imposing secrecy
where none is justified or by retaining it long after the justification has
become invalid, for simple reasons of political or bureaucratic
convenience. To hide mistakes ofjudgment, to protect individuals, to
cover up the loss and waste of funds, almost everything in government is
kept secret for a time and, in the foreign policy field, classified as
"secret" and "sensitive" beyond any rule of law and reason. Every minor
official can testify to this fact.
Id.
141.
LOWENTHAL, supra note 54, at 42, 205- 207. Section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266,
335 (2007), requires the Director of National Intelligence to disclose to the public the
aggregate amount appropriated by Congress for intelligence purposes at the end of each fiscal
year. Beginning fiscal year 2009, the President may waive or postpone the disclosure
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spend too little or too much on intelligence collection, and the ability to
mask the costs of such collection removes important incentives to
allocate efficiently scarce resources for that purpose. 142 To take another
example, if for secrecy reasons intelligence users are denied access to
information needed to verify the accuracy of intelligence upon which a
policy decision is based, there is less reason for intelligence producers to
make sure such intelligence is accurate in the first place. But perhaps the
most costly impact of secrecy is lack of trust. Since secrecy enables the
government to shift costs, the public is justified in taking what the
government has to say with a grain of salt, and in the end may reject a
proposal that would actually benefit it.
C. The Lessons of Secrecyfor Democracy
As discussed in Part II, democratic concepts and deliberative
principles do not always provide definitive guidance on the uses of
secrecy. In this Part III, however, I have shown that although the
protection of sources and methods is often a compelling reason for
secrecy, it is not always so. Much is publicly known about these sources
and methods, and to some extent, the need for secrecy is not uniform
among all sources and methods because some are less vulnerable to
detection or evasion, or both, than others. Further, the protection of
sources and methods is only as important as the intelligence derived
from them, which in turn is only as important as the role intelligence
plays in policymaking.
Finally, the dynamics of information
asymmetries are such that secrets result in inefficiencies and perverse
incentives in the collection, processing, and dissemination of
intelligence, which ultimately results in shifting the costs of inaccurate
or incomplete information to the public. The upshot is that the secrecy
argument shares aspects of reality and unreality, as does democracy as
idea and institution.

requirement if he provides a statement to the respective Senate and House select committees
on intelligence that such disclosure would "damage national security." Id. sec. 601(b). The
President must detail the reasons for a waiver or postponement; such reasons can be in
classified form. Id. For a general discussion of Presidential certifications and determinations,
see Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 217 (1999).
142
Even under the 2007 legislation, since only the aggregate amount of money
budgeted for intelligence must be disclosed, supra note 141, the public and most members of
Congress will not be able to assess theose more detailed allocations.
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IV. DEMOCRACY AND SECRECY IN VARIOUS CONTEXTS
A. Framingthe Democracy v. Secrecy Debate
Given the foregoing discussions of democracy and secrecy on their
respective merits, how might the two inform each other? As an initial
matter, to conceive of democracy in terms of freedom from coercion,
meaningful consent, deliberation, or accountability is to do so on very
broad terms that sometimes do not give much purchase. However, if
intelligence derived from protected sources and methods, is, although
the product of experts, necessarily tentative, and about which there are
varying degrees of confidence, and which comprise only one of several
factors decision-makers take into account, then the debate about
democracy and secrecy is much more complex than a collision between
the ideals of a political system and the realities of national security and
its demands. The attack on Pearl Harbor was certainly real, as were the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But equally real
was the internment of Japanese Americans and, as of this writing, the
deaths of thousands of American soldiers and many more Iraqi
civilians--events set into motion at least in part on intelligence
assessments 144 that were either ignored 143 or eventually proved
groundless.
Such results would be of concern to any country, let alone a
democracy. If they do nothing else, the broad democratic concepts
discussed in Part II highlight or locate areas of concern that merit higher
scrutiny of the secrecy argument. There are undoubtedly times when the
secrecy argument will prevail. However, the conclusions drawn from
Part III indicate that the secrecy argument should not always carry the
day.
143.

J. Edgar Hoover and others argued that there was no national security reason for

relocating Japanese-Americans. TETSUDEN KASHIMA, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 186-88

(1996).
144. COMM'N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 45 (2005) available at
http://www.wmd.gov./report/wmd-report.pdf [hereinafter COMM'N ON THE INTELLIGENCE
CAPABILITIES] (concluding Iraq was not engaged in the production of weapons of mass
destruction at the time of the invasion); SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, POSTWAR
FINDINGS ABOUT IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS AND LINKS TO TERRORISM AND How THEY
COMPARE WITH PREWAR ASSESSMENTS, S. REP. NO. 109-331 (2d. Sess. 2006) (reaching the
same conclusion with respect to weapons of mass destruction and finding there were no
meaningful links between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda).
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B. Situations of Strict Scrutiny
1. Decisions of NationalMoment
One area in which the secrecy argument must be given particular
scrutiny is when the country is making decisions of national moment,
such as the decision to go to war. It goes without saying that the use of
force is costly in terms of lives, resources, and reputation. Yet, as was
true on the eve of World War 1I, the argument that sources and methods
must be protected appears most persuasive against the backdrop of
looming armed conflict.
One cannot overstress, however, that short of an armed attack or a
declaration of war by an adversary, the decision to use force will always
turn on judgments with varying degrees of certainty about an adversary's
intentions and activities. In this context, the question arises whether any
source or method and the information flows either is designed to protect
is worth the human, economic, and reputational costs of engaging in
armed conflict in error. This is particularly salient because, as discussed
in Part II, the kind of intelligence used to justify the use of force is the
predictive intelligence or general assessment of an adversary's plans that
the intelligence community itself urges should not be taken as
unqualified truth.
In these contexts, democratic concerns come to the fore: because
the stakes are so high and citizens will bear the brunt of a decision to use
force, this is precisely when meaningful consent by citizens is most
required and when their representatives need to give compelling reasons
for incurring the costs of war. In this kind of decision, "citizens are
capable of judging as well as officials, and if they are less informed, it is
the fault of the officials who conceal critical information." 145 If the
reasons for engaging in conflict are based on secret judgments of the
intelligence community, those who are making the case for armed
conflict must be prepared either to disclose the information needed to
assess the reliability of such intelligence or to have their claims heavily
discounted.

145.
(1996).

AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 97
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2. DecisionsImpactingIndividuals and Government Compliance
with Law
It is probably in the area of civil liberties that the effects of secrecy
in decision-making are the most poignant and painful, evoking
Kafkaesque images of persons who find themselves subjected to absurd
and nightmarish treatment. Here the coercive force of government
becomes most salient and thus justifies careful scrutiny of the secrecy
argument when used in this context. Yet, the post 9/11 use of
extraordinary renditions, severe interrogation tactics, indefinite
detention, and warrantless surveillance find their justification, in part, as
sources and methods needed to prevent further attacks. How are such
justifications to be assessed?
The literature on the impact of government policies on civil
liberties and human rights after 9/11 is voluminous, 146 and it is beyond
the scope of this Article to discuss all of the issues raised by these
practices, particularly as they relate to individuals. That democracies
must protect counter-majoritarian interests is of course an important part
of democratic accounts. In the national security context, the issue is
often framed as a tension between counter-majoritarian and majoritarian
interests or between Kantian and utilitarian understandings of justice. I
limit my discussion here, however, to the view that a democratic
constitution reflects decisions about the community's values and about
how it will conduct itself, even in times of conflict. In a constitution, the
majority has pre-committed itself to preserving certain countermajoritarian interests. The same is true with laws that emerge from that
constitution. Thus, although it may be that the U.S. Constitution is not
(to use what is becoming a worn-out phrase) a suicide pact, something
vital to democracy is lost if widely held substantive values expressed in
the Constitution and other law, which are meant to strike a balance
between security and liberty, are ignored. As Jon Elster notes: "If the

146. Several authors have discussed and criticized post 9/11 administration policies
regarding detention, interrogation and torture. See, e.g., Jos& E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law,
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 175 (2006); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking
Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425 (2005); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraintson
Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255 (2006); Jeremy
Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudencefor the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1681 (2005). On the history of civil liberties in times of national crisis, see GEOFFREY R.
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME, FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO
THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
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framers try to prevent the constitution from becoming a suicide pact, it
may lose its efficacy as a suicide prevention device."' 47
These concerns often arise in the courts, since they decide what the
law is, but the secrecy dilemma also bedevils relations here. The state
secrets doctrine is one example. 48 Under that doctrine, the government
can ask the court to protect certain information as privileged state
secrets. If the court decides such information is privileged, the court will
If there is enough non-privileged
exclude it from consideration.
evidence to enable the parties to make their respective cases, the court
will dismiss the
can allow a case to proceed; but if there is not, the court
49
case, often on grounds of lack of standing or ripeness.
A recent decision illustrates the problems raised by the doctrine. In
El-Masri v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit used the state secrets doctrine to affirm the dismissal by a federal
district court of a challenge to the CIA's extraordinary rendition
The plaintiff, a German citizen, alleged the CIA had
policy. 50
147.

JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT,

AND CONSTRAINTS 174 (2000) (emphasis omitted).
148. For recent discussions of the doctrine, see Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the
Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007); Amanda Frost,
The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007);
William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI.
Q. 85 (2005). The dilemma shows itself in other contexts, such as the use of secret evidence
in military commissions. Military Commissions Act, § 3, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950 (2006).
There, a military judge may protect from disclosure "the sources, methods or activities by
which the United States obtained the evidence" against the defense, if the military judge finds
such information to be classified. Id. § 949j(c)(2). In such an instance, the military judge may
require the trial counsel to provide, "to the extent practicable, an unclassified summary" of
such sources, methods, or activities. Id. The same procedure is followed for exculpatory
evidence. Id. § 949j(d)(l). In respect to Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests, in
CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the names and institutional
affiliations of persons who participated in CIA-sponsored research on the use of biological,
chemical, and radiological materials to alter human behavior were not subject to FOIA
disclosure. In doing so, the Court found that the Director of Intelligence had broad power to
protect "sources and methods" as required by Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act
and rejected a narrower, functional definition of intelligence sources that focused on whether
confidentiality was needed to obtain the type of information desired. Id. at 168-69; see also
Martin E. Halstuk & Eric B. Easton, Of Secrets and Spies: Strengthening the Public'sRight to
Know about the CIA, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 353, 375-80 (2006) (arguing that provisions
of the Intelligence and Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act curtail the reach of Sims).
149. The modem doctrine arose from United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
There the U.S. Supreme Court denied on state secrecy grounds access to certain documents
related to the crash of a B-29 bomber that was testing secret electronic equipment. For recent
discussions of the doctrine, see Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 148, at 87; Chesney, supra note
148; Frost, supra note 148.
150. EI-Masri v. U. S., 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 373 (2007).
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transported him from Macedonia to Afghanistan, where he was detained
and subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 1 ' The CIA
claimed the state secrets privilege, and the appeals court relied on two
declarations by the Director of the CIA-one unclassified and the other
classified-which stated that there was a danger state secrets would be
revealed if the litigation went forward. 152 According to the appeals
court, the classified CIA declaration "detailed the information the United
States sought to protect, explained why further court proceedings would
unreasonably risk . . . disclosure, and spelled out why such disclosure

would be detrimental to the national security .... ,,3 The appeals court
relied on the government's claims in the confidential declaration and did
not engage in its own in camera review of the evidence at issue to
determine whether the privilege was warranted.1 54 The court found the
case could not proceed on publicly available information, in part because
in the court's view, the government would not be able to craft an
adequate defense without disclosing information "regarding
the means
55
and methods by which the CIA gathers intelligence."
The court was able to justify its decision in part because an
individual plaintiff was involved. At the end of its opinion, the court
acknowledged that the "successful interposition of the state secrets
privilege imposes a heavy burden on the party against whom the
privilege is asserted."' 156 When the privilege is imposed, however, the

151. Id. at 300.
152. Id. at309-10.
153. Id. at 301.
154. Id. at 306, 311-12.
155. EI-Masri, 479 F.3d.at 309. According to the appeals court, such information might
include the fact and details of his detention; testimony from personnel involved; the identities
of participating countries, if any; information about how CIA operations are specified; how
the CIA makes personnel assignments; and the production of witnesses whose identities are
classified. Id. at 309-10.
156. Id. at 313. As a related matter, it appears the appeals court had some misgivings
about basing its decision on information given in the classified declaration, to which the
plaintiff had no access. Id. at 312. The appeals court wrote: "That El-Masri is unfamiliar with
the [c]lassified [d]eclaration's explanation for the privilege claim does not imply ... that no
such explanation was required, or that the district court's ruling was simply an unthinking
ratification of a conclusory demand by the executive branch." Id. The problem with that
response, of course, is that in camera and ex parte examinations of "evidence" and arguments
undermines a findamental principle of the adversarial system, that the parties, not the judge,
are responsible for framing their respective cases and marshalling evidence for them.
WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED

STATES 82 (4th ed. 2006).
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plaintiffs "personal interest in pursuing his157
civil claim is subordinated to
the collective interest in national security."
This is not an unprincipled argument, but it is far from conclusive.
Whether a person has been deprived of due process or has been
subjected to unlawful treatment is not just an individual concern.
Several commentators have criticized the state secrets doctrine as a
common-law creation having no basis in the Constitution, and argue that
it undermines aspects of the Constitutional structure. William Weaver
and Robert Pallitto argue that overuse of the doctrine since the Carter
Administration, and the almost unquestioning deference of the courts
when the privilege has been evoked, threatens the independence of the
judiciary. 158 Amanda Frost argues that the doctrine diminishes the
power of Congress to establish the jurisdiction of courts and to oversee
the executive branch.159 Louis Fisher points out, in addition to the
criticisms posed by other commentators,
that the provenance of the
1 60
doctrine is itself questionable.'
If these authors are correct, the doctrine also exacts costs on
national security writ large. As Richard Betts argues:
One may accept that decentralization, separation of powers, and checks and
balances make democracy constitutionally antistrategic. But one may also
assume that the procedural norms of constitutional democracy are, at least for
the United States, the highest national security value, ranking above particular
substantive values that come and go in policy.

Why might this be so? Betts does not put it in these terms, but
apart from the structural protections that might be jeopardized by the
overreaching of one political branch, it is because, as discussed earlier,
given the high degree of delegation in modern democracies, sometimes
the only claims to legitimacy a government has in the eyes of citizens
with little to no real power (particularly where national security is
involved), are that the government has taken into account their interests,
it can provide plausible reasons for the actions it takes, and is itself
157. EI-Masri,479 F.3d at 313.
158. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 148, at 87.
159. Frost, supra note 148, at 1959.
160. Louis FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006). Fisher points out decades after the Reynolds
decision, the documents originally sought in that litigation were declassified, and contained no
secrets. Id. at 165-207. He concludes that the government deceived the courts into believing

records of the accident were important to national security.
161. Betts, supra note 100, at 41.
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guided by law. If the government does otherwise, it risks jeopardizing
support for the very national security measures it seeks to take, 162 as
well as the system of government those measures are supposed to
protect.
For example, in 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA), which prohibits the use of cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment of detainees held by the United States. 163 The legislation
reflects a value judgment that certain interrogation methods violate
human dignity and are off-limits, even after 9/11. In this context, very
little weight should be given to secrecy arguments when Congress or the
courts are asked to determine whether such legislation is being obeyed.
This follows not only because civil liberties are involved, but also
because it is vital to the functioning of a government to determine
whether enacted law is being implemented and whether it is effective.
This is not to say, if the arguments I made in Part II are correct, that
the issues are simple. Consider a situation in which someone alleges
before a court that the government has subjected him to an interrogation
method expressly prohibited by the DTA. Assume a video recording
proves unequivocally the prohibited method was used, but it also records
other lawful interrogation methods that would be disclosed if the video
recording is used in evidence. Under those circumstances, it would not
be surprising for the government to argue in a confidential pleading that,
although it neither confirms nor denies that the video recording does in
fact capture the proscribed method, it can confirm that a number of
classified interrogation techniques and methods would be disclosed if
the video recording is used in evidence. 164 Given the history of court
deference to the government in these cases, it would be equally
unsurprising for a court to agree with the government, find that the video
recording is privileged under the state secrets doctrine, and conclude
either that the person who has made the allegations therefore lacks
standing, or that the matter is not yet ripe for adjudication.

162. See Marc J. Hetherington, The PoliticalRelevance of Political Trust, 92 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 791 (1998) (discussing the link between trust in government and the success of
government policies).
163. Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003(a), 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 200Odd (2006)).
164. For a discussion of interrogation techniques and their effectiveness, see
INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE BOARD, NATIONAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE, EDUCING
INFORMATION, INTERROGATION: SCIENCE AND ART: FOUNDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE (2006),

availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf (an anthology of articles on the subject).
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An outcome like this is difficult to assess given the amorphous
nature of both democratic principles and the secrecy argument. On the
one hand, as I have just discussed, one can argue that legislation
prohibiting the interrogation method in question results from democratic
values and processes and should be honored as such. Yet the same
democracy, by prohibiting some methods, implicitly allows others, some
of which would be disclosed if the video recording comes to light.
Moreover, one could argue that court detenninations about whether
secret information is privileged-particularly when courts view evidence
in camera- 165represent the kind of partial secrecy suggested by
Thompson, which is tolerated in a deliberative democracy. Finally,
applying the state secrets doctrine in such circumstances would allow the
government to shield discovery of prohibited intelligence activities by
mixing them with permitted activities, but the government probably does
in fact use an array of sources and methods that cannot be easily
separated in a way that would allow the method in question to be
disclosed for evaluation without disclosing permissible intelligence
sources or methods.
On the other hand, every time a court privileges certain evidence as
a state secret, there is a good chance it is misapplying the precautionary
principle. This is because neither the choice to grant the privilege nor to
deny it is risk free. Granting the privilege might indeed protect a
legitimate source or method of intelligence. But it will also undermine
both the individual's and the polity's interest in the vindication of her
constitutional rights or legislative protections, or both, and could
endanger the constitutional structures and the values they embody.
Additionally, while on balance the government is in the better position to
assess the harm to the country caused by a particular disclosure, the
court is in a just as good or better position to determine the harm caused
by not allowing the case to proceed. Further, given the current state of
the doctrine, where even in camera inspection of classified information
166
is prohibited, the claim to privilege could have no basis in fact.
165.
In this regard, however, the El-Masri court stated it was prevented from making its
own direct determination of the evidence because of the Reynolds case. E1-Masri v. United
States, 479 F.3d 296, 312 (4th Cir. 2007). According to the Reynolds court, once a judge
finds information is privileged, the judge herself should not review such information even
alone in chambers. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
166. In light of the larger issues implicating the balance of powers, the prohibition of in
camera inspection of allegedly privileged evidence is incomprehensible. The El-Masri court,
aware of concerns that the state secrets doctrine cedes excessive power to the executive
branch, argued that it is the very determination of privilege by a court that prevents the state
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Finally, the court could take these risks to protect a source or method
that is already known, that needs no protection because it is resistant to
countermeasures, or that may be unproven, unreliable, or that may lead
to intelligence that67in the end will go unheeded or play only a small role
in policymaking. 1

secrets doctrine from lapsing into "a surrender of judicial control over access to the courts."
EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 312 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if it is possible to move
past the circularity of that reasoning, it is surprising that a court would rely solely on
arguments made in confidential declarations from the executive branch. Legislation proposed
in early 2008 attempts to address some of these concerns. The State Secrets Protection Act, S.
2533, 110th Cong. (2008), sets out procedures for invoking the state secrets privilege. Under
the proposed legislation, if the United States invokes the privilege, a federal court is
empowered and required to hold an in camera hearing, at which the United States must
provide all evidence that the United States claims is protected. Id. § 2. If the court determines
that the item of evidence is subject to the privilege, it will not be used in evidence. Id. In that
case, however, subject to certain requirements, the court must order the United States to
provide a non-privileged substitute for the privileged evidence. Id. If the United States
refuses to do so, the issue in question will be decided in the non-government party's favor. S.
2533, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008). A federal court may dismiss a claim or counterclaim on the
basis of the state secrets act only if it determines first, that it is impossible to provide a nonprivileged substitute that would provide a "substantially equivalent opportunity" to litigate the
claim or counterclaim; second, that the dismissal would not "harm national security;" and
third, that continuing with the litigation without the privileged evidence "would substantially
impair the ability of a party to pursue a valid defense to the claim or counterclaim." Id.
167.
Some of these issues are at stake in the on-going controversy over the CIA's
destruction of video recordings of interrogations of two detainees suspected of ties with Al
Qaeda. In the video recordings, the detainees are being subjected to severe forms of
interrogation. See Mark Mazzetti, C.IA. Destroyed 2 Tapes Showing Interrogations, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at Al. Such harsh techniques are believed to include waterboarding, in
which the subject is made to feel as if he is drowning. These harsh forms of interrogation
have been criticized as forms of torture, although the administration denies this. Several
commentators have discussed and criticized these interrogation techniques. See, e.g., George
J. Annas, Human Rights Outlaws: Nuremberg, Geneva, and the Global War on Terror, 87
B.U. L. REV. 427 (2007); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1571-72 (2007); Steven A.
Saltzburg, A Different War: Ten Key Questions about the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1021, 1045 n.100 (2007). Although the U.S. military is prohibited from engaging in
harsher forms of interrogation, the CIA is not, even though the CIA is reported to have halted
waterboarding in 2003. Scott Shane, House Passes Restrictions on Interrogation Methods,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at A18 (reporting that intelligence officials state waterboarding
has not been used since 2003). The CIA argues that the tapes were destroyed in part to protect
interrogators and their families from reprisals. See Mazzetti supra. However, CIA officers
involved in the decision are reported to have said that "a primary factor was the legal risks
that officers shown on the tape might face."
Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Tapes'
Destruction Hovers over Detainee Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008, at Al. In 2008,
President Bush vetoed legislation that would have prohibited the CIA from using certain harsh
interrogation techniques. Steven Lee Meyers, Bush Vetoes Bill on CIA. Tactics, Affirming
Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at Al.
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C. Assessing PoliticalBranch Decisions and Oversight
Given the problems that emerge in the judicial branch when secrets
are involved, more intense focus falls on the political branches because
they are responsible for setting and executing the national security policy
with which secrets are so intertwined. An incident in 2006 illustrates
some of the difficulties here. That fall, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence issued a report on postwar findings on Iraq's purported
WMD programs and links to terrorist organizations.' 68 As discussed
earlier, claims that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction and
that it was linked to terrorist organizations were the primary reasons
given for invasion, claims subsequently proved to be false. The report
compared the post-war findings on these issues with the erroneous prewar assessments, and classified information was used in making the
report. 169

Concerns about the use of secret information against individuals also arise in the holding of
detainees at Guantanamo Bay. In Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008), the U.S.
Supreme Court found that aliens held as enemy combatants at Guantanamo were entitled to
habeas corpus protection. Id. at 2240. In its holding the Court rejected arguments that the
system whereby Combatant Status Review Tribunals determine (subject to review by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) whether an individual is a lawfully held
enemy combatant, provided an adequate substitute for the writ. Id. at 2274. The Court
reasoned in part that the procedures followed by the tribunals allowed for "considerable risk
of error" in the findings of fact, in part because of the "constraints upon the detainee's ability
to rebut the factual basis for the Government's assertion that he is an enemy combatant." Id.
at 2238. Such constraints included the government's ability to use secret information against
the detainee. Id., at 2238.
Following the Court's decision in Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit overturned the finding of
a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that a detainee was an enemy combatant. Parhat v.
Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The evidence used to support the government's
case against the detainee came from four U.S. intelligence documents, redacted from the
public version of the opinion. Id. at 844-45. The court stated that the documents described
events and relationships as having "reportedly" occurred, or "suspected of' having taken
place. Id. at 846. "But in virtually every instance," the court criticized, "the documents do
not say who 'reported' or 'said' or 'suspected' those things. Nor do they provide any of the
underlying reporting upon which the documents' bottom-line assertions are founded, nor any
assessment of the reliability of that reporting." Id. at 846-47. The court noted that the
government might be able to submit information in forms that would protect the identity of a
valuable source, but the court could not rubber-stamp as factual government assertions
without evidence to support them. Id. at 849-50.
168.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, POSTWAR FINDINGS ABOUT IRAQ'S WMD
PROGRAMS AND LINKS TO TERRORISM AND How THEY COMPARE WITH PREWAR

ASSESSMENTS, S. REP. No. 109-331 (2d. Sess. 2006).
169. See id. at 4-8.
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The committee acknowledged that a balance must be struck
between the need to protect sources and methods and the need for
transparency of intelligence activities. 17 At the same time, however, the
committee protested the intelligence community's decision to keep
certain portions of the report's findings and conclusions secret:
In its decision to keep this information from the public, the Intelligence
Community was unable to demonstrate to the Committee that disclosing the
redacted information would compromise sensitive sources and methods or
otherwise harm national security.
The Committee concludes that the
Intelligence Community's decision to classify this information is without
justification. 171

Decision-makers were not persuaded by arguments that certain
classified information would jeopardize sources and methods if made
public. However, the committee allowed the classification decision to
stand, thus depriving the rest of Congress and the public of information
that would have helped it assess the wisdom of a decision of national
importance.
The relationship between the legislative and executive branches in
the area of national security is complex and difficult, as is the
relationship between these branches and the intelligence community.
Congress has occasionally asserted its powers in matters relevant to
foreign and national security policy, but over time, the executive branch
has come to dominate the conduct of foreign affairs. 172 Nowhere is this
dominance clearer than in the area of intelligence. 173 Most concede the
170.
171.

Id. at 7.
Id. at8.

172. This is part of a more general trend in which the office of the Presidency has grown
in importance, particularly since the Roosevelt Administration. See, e.g., Michael A. Fitts,
The Paradoxof Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized PresidencyMay Not
Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PENN. L. REv. 827, 841-45 (1996)

(describing the rise of the modem presidency and theoretical justifications for centralization of
power in the president). The "dominance" of the executive over Congress in respect of
intelligence matters should not be over exaggerated. Barrett finds that in the 1950s, Congress,
through a select few, had fairly regular contact with the intelligence community since its
modem post-War incarnation. BARRETT, supra note 73, at 459-61. Although Congress in
the 1950s deferred to the Executive branch in the conduct of foreign affairs and national
security policy, it was not completely silent. It actually overrode the Eisenhower
administration by appropriating more than requested for missile development. Id. at 279-80.
And, Congress could be just as assertive in foreign affairs, pressing for covert operations. Id.
at 95-112.
173. See, e.g., ANDREW, supra note 34 (discussing the use of intelligence by U.S.
presidents). Such executive interest goes back to the time of Washington, who had a keen
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intelligence community is primarily responsible to the executive branch

and that the executive branch should set the agenda for the intelligence
community's activities.

Accordingly, the executive branch is seen as

playing a major role in overseeing them. 174

Under the executive

umbrella, the intelligence community views itself as playing a unique
role because it serves the needs of several agencies by providing them
with intelligence relevant to policymaking within the appropriate
competencies of the various agencies. 175
At its inception, it was
intended to be independent of the various departments and uninvolved in
policymaking so that it could provide as objective information as

possible1 76 although, of course,177the line between policymaking and
intelligence analysis often blurs.
These relationships between the intelligence

community,

the

President and other executive agencies become more complex because
Congress also is involved. Congress uses intelligence in three activities:

in the exercise of its Constitutional powers, such as control over the
budget and the regulation of foreign commerce; in attempts to exert
influence in foreign relations, defense and, national security, areas that
overlap with executive concerns; and in its oversight over the

intelligence community as part of its more general role of ensuring that
the executive meets its responsibility of executing the laws. 178 As might

appreciation for intelligence and the need to keep them secret. See, e.g., Letter from George
Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton (July 26, 1777), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 478-479 (J.
Fitzpatrick ed. 1933), availableat http://etext.virginia.edu/washington/fitzpatrick/.
174. For a discussion of Executive branch oversight of the intelligence community, see
HOLT, supra note 4, at 200-07; LOWENTHAL, supra note 54, at 191-95.
175. LOWENTHAL, supra note 54, at 4.
176. MICHAEL WARNER & J. KENNETH MCDONALD, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
INTELLIGENCE, U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REFORM STUDIES SINCE 1947, at 4 (2005),
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/books-andmonographs/US%201ntelligence%2OCommunity%2OReform%20Studies%2OSince%
201947.pdf. Warner and McDonald write that in 1945, the view of many policymakers was
that "the President and his key advisers needed a control variable against which to test the
intelligence and policy advice coming from the departments. Only a free standing intelligence
agency could provide such a perspective." Id.
177. See SHULSKY & SCHMITT, supra note 74, at 133-41 (discussing the close
relationship between policy-making and intelligence analysis).
178. Snider, supra note 94, at 95.
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be expected, the lines between these three activities also blur in
practice. 179
The intelligence community has supported Congress in each of
these roles through a series of informal arrangements. 180 A great deal of
intelligence is shared with Congress on a regular basis.1 81 According to
Alfred Cumming, Congress is given access to most forms of finished
intelligence, including the National Intelligence Estimates.'1 82 The CIA

179. For example, much of Congress's "oversight" of the CIA in the 1950s took place
through the appropriations committees, which of course represent Congress's budgetary
power. BARRETT, supra note 73, at 19-21.
180. Id. at 49-50, n.10. (citing CIA statement that "[it is all very well ... to state that
both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget must understand that the Central Intelligence
Agency must be given, in effect, a blank check and a free hand. In practice, the Central
Intelligence Agency must justify its demands with some reason and logic and must reassure
both of those bodies that the Central Intelligence Agency is, at least, somewhat careful with
government funds and does its best to guard against waste and fraud").
181.
Congressional authority to have access to confidential intelligence stems from its
constitutional powers to make the laws and to oversee the executive branch. Snider, supra
note 94; KATE MARTIN, CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, CONGRESSIONAL
ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 1-2 (2007), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/03/pdf/congressional-oversight report.pdf.
Moreover, the President is charged with the duty of making sure that Congress is "kept fully
and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 413
(2006). The executive branch has argued that it has the exclusive right to the production and
management of classified information. Christopher H. Schroeder, Memorandum Opinion for
the General Counsel Central Intelligence Agency, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 402, 404 (Nov.
26, 1996) (arguing that the president has "ultimate and unimpeded authority" over national
security information). These arguments have arisen when individuals in the intelligence
community provide information to Congress without authorization. Id. at 405; see also
Disclosure of Classified Information to Congress, Hearings Before the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the U.S. Senate, 1 0 5 th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998) (containing testimony regarding
Congressional access to intelligence information from members of the intelligence
community). Members of Congress do not receive security clearances as such. See
Schroeder, supra, at 406. However, each of the House and Senate Select Committees on
Intelligence-committees with primary authority for the oversight of the intelligence
community-have in place rules for the protection and dissemination of classified
information. See H.R. Comm. on Rules, Rule X(1 1) (H.R. Select Comm. on Intelligence
rules); Rules of Procedure for the H. Permanent Select Comm. On Intelligence, 11 0 th Cong.,
Rules 12-14; see also S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (as amended by S. Res., 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), S. Res. 445, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004), and S. Res. 50, § 8, 110th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2007)) (setting out rules for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence);
Rules of Procedure for the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, Rule 9 (establishing additional
procedures for the treatment of classified information). The committees give security
clearances to staff members in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. Rules
of the House of Representatives, R. X(l l)(e), 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2008), available at
http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/ lOth.pdf.
182. Memorandum from Alfred Cumming, Specialist in Intelligence and National
Security, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, to Sen. Dianne Feinstein on Congress
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estimates that in 2004 it gave Congress 4000 publications. 8 3 The
intelligence community also briefs various committees of Congress,
usually behind closed doors. There were about 1000 such briefings in
2004.184 Some intelligence, however, is not routinely shared with
Congress. This includes the identities of foreign agents; the methods of
intelligence gathering and analysis; raw, unanalyzed intelligence; and
certain reports specifically tailored for
members of the executive branch,
85
1
Brief.
Daily
President's
the
as
such
Although much information is provided to Congress, most of it is
shared with a relatively small number of members. From the beginning,
Congress chose an elite model of oversight, in which a small set of
powerful members of Congress would be given access to intelligence. 186
Since the reforms following the Church hearings in the mid-1970s,
oversight of the intelligence community takes place through select
committees on intelligence in both houses of Congress, whose
deliberations are often conducted in closed sessions to which other
members of Congress are not given ready access.' 87 Of course, the
committee structure is not unique to intelligence; it is part of Congress as
a whole and is an attempt to capture the efficiencies of specialization
even in a representative body. In the area of intelligence, however, the
committee structure is also intended to protect classified
information.
88
As such, it is an example of Thompson's partial secrecy.'

as a Consumer of Intelligence Information, at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/congress.pdf.

183.

Id. at 9 n.38.

184.

Id.

185.

Id. at5-6.

186.

BARRE'r, supra note 73, at 22.

9 (Dec.

14,

2005), available at

187. In the case of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, a
representative who is not a member of the committee must go through a multi-stage
approval process before he may sit in on a closed or executive session or gain access to
classified information, with the possibility such approval will be denied. Rules of
Procedure for the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 11 0 th Cong., Rule 14(f);
see also Frederick M. Kaiser, Protection of Classified Information by Congress:
Practices and Proposals, CRS Report RS20748, at 4 (2006), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS20748 01112006.p
df (arguing that the House select committee requirements and procedures for granting
non-committee members access to classified information are the most exacting). The
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence also imposes similar restrictions on access to
classified materials and closed meetings. Rules of Procedure for the S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, Rules 9.5-9.10.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
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Much, therefore, hinges on the ability of a relatively small number
of members of Congress to evaluate claims based on intelligence. As
Shulsky and Schmitt point out, the committee structure is highly
problematic from a democratic perspective: "[T]he notion of
congressional oversight conducted secretly contains a self-contradiction:
One wants to obtain the benefits of legislative deliberation on
intelligence matters, but one rules out from the start the major method of
such deliberation-full and open public debate."'8 9These problems are
exacerbated by institutional dynamics. Amy Zegart argues that the fact
the national security agencies are comprised of large bureaucracies, their
housing in the executive branch, and the motivations of Congress, weigh
against effective Congressional oversight.1 90 She points out that national
security agencies differ from domestic agencies because for the most
part they are not supported by interest groups, which results in less
Congressional interest in overseeing these institutions. 191 Secrecy itself
makes oversight difficult.'1 92 Further, the pre-eminence of the executive
branch in the formation of foreign and security policy leads to weak
oversight. 193 Finally, she acknowledges that there are members of
Congress who take an interest in foreign affairs and national security,
but in her view, such members are94 rare and tend to support the
president's primacy in foreign affairs.'
These kinds of problems are evident in the pre-invasion intelligence
assessments debacle. The executive branch has been heavily criticized
for its reliance on a National Intelligence Estimate issued in late 2002,
which found incorrectly that Iraq was actively engaged in a nuclear
weapons program.' 95 Based on their examination of publicly available
documents, Joseph Cirincione and his co-authors conclude that before
2002, the intelligence community appears to have had a generally
accurate picture of the state of Iraqi nuclear and missile programs, but
overestimated the development of its biological and chemical warfare

189.
190.

SHULSKY AND SCHMITT, supra note 74, at 146.
AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND

NSC (1999).

191.
192.
193.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.

194.
195.

ZEGART, supra note 190, at 32-33.
COMM'N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES, supra note 144, at 45.

Id.at31.
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programs. 196 They argue the shift in assessments after 2002 is consistent
with the argument that the intelligence reports were being influenced by
political considerations. 197
Others have argued that the executive branch manipulated
assessments to achieve political ends, 198 but what is interesting for
purposes of this discussion is the response of committees charged with
overseeing the intelligence community. In an article written in 2005,
Bob Graham, the chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
during 9/11 and the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, wrote that the 2002
National Intelligence Estimate was prepared at the request of the Senate,
not the executive branch. 199 According to Graham, the classified version
of the 2002 NIE was very troubling because the document was full of
qualifications, which prompted Graham to ask that a public version be
released.200 However, that version was much more unequivocal in its
assertions about the Iraqi programs. 20 1 Graham's assessment of the
reliability of the estimate jibes well with that of Ciricione and his coauthors. Based on their reading of portions of the classified version
released to the public in 2003, Cirincione and his co-authors point out
there were a number of red flags that should have signaled that the
accuracy of the NIE was in question.2 02 The October NIE had some
forty caveats, atypical for an NIE, which, as discussed earlier, is meant
to reflect the collective judgment of the intelligence community. 0 3
Moreover, agencies within the intelligence community, the State
Department Bureau of Intelligence, and Research and the Department of
Energy disputed the claim that Iraq had restarted its nuclear program.20 4
Senator Graham shares that doubts about the accuracy of claims
made in the report (and his corresponding doubts about the strength of

196.

JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, ET. AL., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,

WMD IN IRAQ:
EVIDENCE
AND
IMPLICATIONS
http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/Iraq3FullText.pdf.

197.

50

(2004),

available

at

Id.

198.
See, e.g., MELVIN A. GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL POLICY REPORT, USES AND
MISUSES
OF
STRATEGIC
INTELLIGENCE
(Jan.
2004),
available
at

http://www.ciponline.org/nationalsecuritylreports/jan04goodman.pdf;
Paul
L.
Pillar,
Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, 85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 15 (2006).
199. Bob Graham, What I Knew Before the Invasion, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2005, at
B07.

200.

Id.

201.

Id.

202.

CIRINCIONE, supra note

203.
204.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 22.

196, at 14.
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the executive branch's case for the invasion) led him to vote against the
resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq.20 5 He writes, "Iwas able
to apply caveat emptor. Most of my colleagues could not., 20 6 The issue
is what Senator Graham means by "my colleagues" and "could not." Is
he referring to his colleagues on the Select Committee? At least in
theory, the members of the select committees are supposed to have the
expertise needed to oversee intelligence matters. One would have
expected those members to detect the same qualifications in the
classified NIE Senator Graham spotted, as well as the inconsistency in
tone between the classified and public versions of the NIE.2 °7 Or is he
referring to his colleagues in the Senate as a whole? Here again secrecy
rears its ugly head. "While Graham . . . could complain that the
administration's and [the director of the CIA's] own statements
contradicted the classified reports they had read, they could not say what
was actually in those reports." 208 Either answer reveals significant
weaknesses in the current system of oversight. Given what I have
discussed in Part III about the nature of NIE assessments, 20 9 it is
alarming that regular members of Congress were not given access to the
classified version.
As it stands, the committee structure exacerbates a situation in
which the executive branch enjoys an informational advantage vis-A-vis
Congress as a whole, with all of the inefficiencies created by information
asymmetries discussed earlier. There will be other times when the
executive branch will urge a policy based on classified information to
which the legislative branch as a whole does not have access, or which is
not capable of independent verification.21 0 When such an informational
asymmetry exists, unless Congress trusts the executive branch as it urges
a particular policy decision, one would expect Congress to discount
justifications for the policy based on secrets and use the best public
information available to reach its decision.

205.

Graham, supra note 199.

206.

Id.

207. Ultimately, five members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, including Graham,
voted against the resolution. See John B. Judis & Spencer Ackerman, The Selling of the Iraq
War: The FirstCasualty, NEW REPUBLIC, June 30, 2003, at 14.
208. Id.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 77-96.
210. This may occur despite the fact that legislation requires the President to report to
Congress certain national security activities. For a discussion of such laws, see Cumming,
supra note 59.
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Such a discount could lead to inefficiencies because sometimes
Congress will decide something based on a presumption that an assertion
is not true when in fact it is, but just as often a discount would prevent
the opposite result. Further, the "threat" of a discount could have at least
two more effects. As an initial matter, it gives voters a metric with
which to hold their representative accountable. If, in the face of an
information asymmetry, a representative does not apply a discount, the
question is "why not?" As I have just discussed, a representative might
be satisfied with meaningful assertions of the executive branch, which
serve as a proxy for the classified information to which she is being
denied access. But if not, the failure to apply a discount would call into
question a representative's judgment.2 11 In addition, the prospect of such
discounts might also encourage the executive branch to perform a
balancing test. It will have to weigh whether it is more important for
national security to persuade the legislative branch to act (which entails
providing verifiable information that could risk the disclosure of sources
and methods) against protecting those sources and methods by not
sharing such information (thereby taking the risk the legislature will not
act because the executive's assertions will be discounted).
Here, however, is another place where the elusive nature of
democratic concepts comes into play. Richard Posner argues that one
reason the executive branch should take the lead in national security
matters is because the legislature is rarely accountable for such
decisions.2 12 It is hard to trace a national security outcome to any one
legislator. In Posner's view the power to act should rest with the person
who can be held responsible, i.e., the president.213 It may be, however,
that no one is accountable. In a study of the impact of memory on
political preferences, Mark Joslyn argues the fact that people cannot
remember their prior political positions results in support for the status
211.
The committee system complicates this situation. Suppose a representative who is
not a member of a select committee is being told by a government official that the state of the
world is X, but will not provide verifying information. The rational representative would
discount the official's statement. But suppose further that the representative is being told by
his colleague, who is a member of a select committee, that the state of the world is X, but the
committee will not provide verifying information. See supra note 187. The representative
would presumably discount this statement as well, but then, who is the representative to
believe? Further, given what we know about the nature of intelligence assessments, one can
ask those on the standing committees whether they, at a minimum, assessed the level of
confidence the intelligence community has in assertions being made in favor of a particular
policy.
212. See POSNER, supra note 53, at 174-75.
213. Id.
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quo.
In a survey taken prior to the first Gulf War, most respondents
stated that they favored peaceful means to resolving the conflict in the
Gulf. After the invasion, most of those respondents incorrectly
remembered they had favored military action before the war.2 15 Joslyn
thus concludes that memories of policy preferences are subject to decay,
and over time, such memories are reconstructed, not recalled. 2 16 These
reconstructions are impacted by perceived current public opinion, even if
this leads to an inaccurate recollection of one's prior position. 217 As a
result, a person who fails to recall the sharp differences between his
personal policy preferences and those the government actually adopted
21 8
is likely to support the status quo by voting for the incumbent.
Although it has been argued that the 2006 election was a referendum on
Iraq, when it comes to national security, there might be a lack of
accountability with respect to either branch. If citizens are uninterested
in these kinds of matters, or public opinion is so easily manipulated, then
219
secrecy concerns fade from view.
V. CONCLUSION

The argument for secrecy to protect sources and methods reflects an
inner logic that continues to play itself out more than sixty-five years
after Pearl Harbor, and particularly after 9/11. That this society is a
democracy means we can flag instances when the interplay between that
inner logic and our collective and individual lives raises concerns about
coercion or interference with democratic processes. However, whether
we locate the core of democracy in widely held values or in our methods

214. Mark R. Joslyn, The Determinants and Consequences of Recall Error about Gulf
War Preferences, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 440 (2003).
215. Id. at441.

216.

Id.

217. Id. at442.
218. Joslyn supra note 214, at 442. In Joslyn's view, exposure to such public opinion
comes largely through the media. Id. at 443. "Significant exposure to the news media, greater
trust in government, and low education signaled individuals so ripe for manipulation that their
memories could be replaced by recollections more consonant with government's position."
Id. at 445. Joslyn then shows that postwar misrecall of Gulf War preferences was a predictor
of voting for the incumbent president. Id. at 447.
219. James Druckman argues, for example, that citizens delegate to credible elites the
task of choosing among possible frames through which policy decisions can be viewed. At
the same time, consistency with those frames serves as a kind of check on elites. See
Druckman, supra note 138.
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for achieving consensus, democratic concepts do not always tell us when
the logic of secrecy should be replaced with other equally valid logics.
At the same time, when the sources and methods argument is
evaluated in light of the sources and methods themselves, the kinds of
intelligence it is designed to cultivate, the role such intelligence plays in
decision-making, and the dynamics secrecy sets into motion, the
argument's underlying logic becomes less inexorable and the argument
itself untenable. This means it is entirely appropriate to subject the
argument for secrecy to very high scrutiny when our representatives
consider decisions of national moment, or when the judiciary is being
asked to determine whether government is obeying the law. At the very
least, we know some of the questions that must be asked of proponents
of secrecy, and we can hold persons accountable for failing to ask those
questions. But in the end, whether the secrecy argument will carry the
day depends on whether citizens wish to enter the debate in the first
place.
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